TASK FORCE III DESERT SHIELD/STORM

File: aaacf_07.txt
Page: 07
Total Pages: 273
DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
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	Iraq invaded Kuwait 2 Aug 1990. C Day was 7 Aug 1990, although selected 
units were placed on alert prior to that date. At least 9 Wings were alerted by 8 
August. Chart 1 reflects the initial deployment timing. Chart 2 depicts the units 
which deployed aircraft or Squadron Medical Elements (SME's). In all, 43 active 
duty SME's were deployed. Chart 3 lists the SME's in place at the peak of the 
deployment. SAC deployed 31 of 78 assigned flight surgeons, and TAC 32 of 87. 
	The SME concept was validated. In most cases, the deployment of Tactical 
and Special Ops aircrews with their SME's went smoothly and as planned and 
practiced. In some cases flight surgeons teamed up to deploy a squadron with one 
gathering optional equipment and providing briefings and the other making 
his/her personal preparations. AFSOC flight surgeons sat on the Wing "Paring 
and Tailoring" Committee to decide in advance priorities for limited airlift. In a 
few cases, flight surgeons were included on ADVON teams. In all cases, flight 
surgeon involvement in planning facilitated initial employment. Some flight 
surgeons were excluded from planning sessions due to inadequate security
clearances or unfavorable "need to know" determinations. This adversely 
impacted their ability to make. timely and pertinent recommendations. 
	In a few cases, the Wing deviated from its usual O-plan because "this is the 
real thing". This often took the form of last minute changes in personnel or 
deploying with greater than planned numbers of people. Limitations of airlift 
found several SME's downsizing their ATC pallets on the flight line. Many flight 
surgeons took advantage of pallets of opportunity, adding supplies to the life 
support pallet or in one case, having pilots carry a bag of IV fluids with them in 
the cockpit. Several units were told they would not need their ATC. This was 
universally bad advice, except to those SME's deploying late to well-established 
bases where they were able to talk to SME's already in place. 
	Medical intelligence was adequate and accessible; however, frequently the 
beddown location was unknown or even changed enroute. This also complicated 
the question of immunization requirements. In addition to routine mobility 
requirements, some early deploying squadrons gave meningococcal vaccine 
which was not required at any Air Force locations, and malaria prophylaxis 
which was only required in Oman. Headquarters guidance was available within 
an acceptable period of time and recommended the 2 versus 5 cc dose of gamma 
globulin to conserve stocks. Consideration was not given to whether aircrews at 
risk of becoming POW's should have different immunization requirements. 
Many flight surgeons gave predeployment briefings to the maintenance and 
support units and felt this paid great dividends in decreased morbidity on arrival 
in the theater.  
	The actual time and date of departure changed frequently and the 
recurrent "false starts" resulted in increased emotional stress for both airmen 
and their families. Some crews were given Restoril (No-go pills) to prepare them 
for an early departure time which then slipped a day. This sequence was 
repeated several days in a row. Most TAC squadrons took off for the AOR in the lte 
afternoon. 
	Strategic aircrews had no organic medical support (SME's). SAC, SAC-
gained, and Aeromedical Evacuation flight surgeons were deployed as 
individuals and were severely disadvantaged in having to learn the missions and 
to establish rapport and integrate with new units from scratch. These flight