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estimates were increased by a factor of 1.65 to account for the need 
to move some patients more than one time, as well as the continuing 
requirement to move disease/nonbattle injury patients. Next, those 
daily patient movement requirements were translated into sorties, 
using a factor of 50 casualties/sortie. Finally, the daily number of 
required AE missions was calculated for both two-sortie missions and 
three-sortie missions. The requirements for intertheater missions 
were based upon an estimate of 90 casualties per mission. According 
to planning data, casualties expected to be generated between D+20 
and D+27 would have resulted in strategic AE patient movement 
requirements of between 1710 and 2520 per day for that eight-day 
period. Those requirements would have, in turn, generated a need for 
between 19 and 28 C-141 missions per day. Since that number of 
missions would have been virtually impossible to support, an 
adjusted strategic AE mission plan was developed. For the adjusted 
plan, flows were leveled between days D+13 and D+31 to smooth the 
curve. However, doing so entailed decreasing the theater evacuation 
policy to three days for that period, plus extending the overall 
evacuation period by two days. The adjusted plan was approved by 
CENTCOM/CCSG and became the basis for strategic AE requirements 
submitted to the Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC). The data are 
summarized in Table 8. 
 
; 
Table 8, AE Mission Planning Data 
 
Intratheater: 
 
Average sorties/day: 21 
Maximum sorties/day: 72 
Average missions/day (2 sorties/mission): 11 
Maximum missions/day (2 sorties/mission): 36 
Average missions/day (3 sorties/mission): 7 
Maximum missions/day (3 sorties/mission): 24 
 
Intertheater: 
 
	Average missions/day: 10 
	Maximum missions/day: 28 
	Average missions/day (adjusted): 9 
	Maximum missions/day (adjusted): 15
 
Source: CENTCOM/CCSG 
 
 
b. Communications. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM communications 
capability, critical to effective operations, proved to be highly 
inconsistent. Although many forms of communication were available, 
their accessibility and reliability were dependent upon geographic 
location and the user service 
 
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