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the AECC directed that strategic and tactical aircrewS be fully 
integrated on both C-130 and C-141 missions. That afforded all AE 
crewmembers an opportunity to receive orientation and training in an 
aircraft other than the one in which they were primarily qualified. 
Doing so provided the TAES with added flexibility should it have 
become necessary to mix crews during contingency operations. Although 
the orientation and training that the AECMs received proved to be very 
beneficial, the concept was not fully accepted by all AECMs and was, 
in fact, specifically questioned by one ARC wing commander. 
 
Recommendation. Integration of AE aircrews ensures maximum flexibility 
and raises the competency and confidence of individual crew members. 
Cross familiarization/qualification should be encouraged whenever 
possible. If at all possible, AECMs should be qualified in all 
potential AE aircraft. 
 
(3) Field Training. 
 
Observation. In many cases, AE personnel were ill-equipped and/or 
lacked individual tactical field training experience to operate in a 
bare base environment. In addition, many were unfamiliar with user 
service support systems and capabilities. 
 
Discussion. Many AE personnel lacked comprehensive training and 
experience required to establish operational elements in austere 
environments. In addition, many personnel lacked sufficient knowledge 
and understanding of Army, Navy and Marine Corps support components 
and the procedures for obtaining billeting, messing, POL and 
logistical support. As a result, in several cases, AE personnel 
encountered significant difficulty in establishing operations and 
interfacing with host base agencies. When AE elements were unable to 
obtain needed support or supplies, the AECC or other delegated AE 
elements were required to intervene on their behalf. Although this was 
difficult due to problems with communications and distance, AECC 
support became crucial to ensuring that AE elements were operational. 
The lack of field knowledge in AE personnel seems to be a result of 
most ARC units not training vigorously enough at bare-base locations 
and/or with host base support systems. ARC personnel questioned on 
this matter indicate that such training is often abbreviated or de-
emphasized due to cost involved and/or the perceived low probability 
of needing such skills. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM revalidated the 
need for standardized, intense training for operational ability in 
austere environments. AE personnel must be self sufficient and capable 
of establishing AE operations under a 
.variety of circumstances and conditions. Exercises which allow the AE 
system to be established at full-service bases are 
-unrealistic and a disservice to the AE system and its personnel. This 
is a symptom of a systemic problem that has been discussed many times 
in the past. There is a definite need for standardized guidance and 
training throughout the AE system. t Moreover, such 
 
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