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1. Personnel:
 
            a. Problem: Several ALCE augmentees deployed without
            weapons, complete A and C bags, self-injectors and MEGP
            status on their orders. Fortunately we had a month and a half
            to acquire these items and any other necessary equipment for all
            deployed members. Mobility processing at home units was
            incomplete and proper information concerning required items in-
            theater did not get passed to mobility processing lines and home
            units. Too many times individuals ware told by their home units
            that they would receive required items when they arrive in
            country. Home units need to refrain from doing this just to get
            the people out of their hair.
 
       Solution: Timely and accurate information needs to be received
    by mobility processing units as well as home units to alleviate
    this problem. Possession of all required mobility items by the
     guard and reserves must be strictly enforced.  Fix the problem at
    home before it becomes a problem in theatre.

    b. Problem: Guard and Reserve Aerial Port augmentees lacked
    proper training in engine running onload/offload (ERO) procedures
    which caused two avoidable serious injuries. Safety knowledge
    was weak at best when quarried bow to properly do an ER0. Aerial
    Port had the misconception that all aircraft would be held to
    their maximum scheduled ground time. These problems were much
    prevalent in the reserve components.

    Solution:   Schedule and document more frequently  ERO training
    during their training periods. This training needs to be
    observed and documented by active duty AF to ensure it is
    being accomplished and not pencil-whipped.  ERO's were a
    necessity due to our heavy airflow and lack of adequate ramp
    space.

    c. Problem: Aerial Port leadership was very deficient in
    job knowledge, use of the chain of command and taking care of
    their people. Major William Burn, III, SMSgt A. Clary Sprouse
    and MSgt Thomas Copeland failed totally as the Senior Aerial Port
    supervisors at this location. APS tried to load cargo that had
    been red-lined for agriculture inspection. Knowledge of ER0
    procedures were weak, ATOC operating procedures were very chaotic
    and how A/DACG operations were supposed to mesh into the
    operation was totally unknown to them. These are just a few
    examples of their poor job knowledge. The senior TR supervisors
    tried to run KKMC like a fixed port even when proven numerous
    times that it wouldn't work. On other occasions SMSgt Sprouse
    tried to coordinate plans in areas where he had no requirement or
    training to do so.  Their was very little progress made in
    training new people in their tasks and flightline safety even
    though the ALCE commander highlighted the importance of these
    areas to Major Burn. On one instance Maj; Burn, SMSgt Sprouse and

 




 

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