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File: aacbd_05.txt
understands that he works for the ALCE CC. He can handle
the outside problems the ALCE CC doesn't have time for.
e. Noteworthy Performance: Most of the problems stated
above were either corrected or improved dramatically when CMSgt
Andersen from the (146 MAPS) Van Nuys Guard arrived and took over
in the TR section. He understood and used the chain of command
very effectively. His people were very well trained and true
professionals at their jobs. His arrival at the start would have
been very welcome. All reserve and guard units should mirror the
training program of the Van Nuys Guard. They are the epitome of
what MAPS is all about.
2. Communications:
a. Problem: Strategic airflow wasn't passed in a timely
manner. Several times we had aircraft arrive without prior
warning. I guess the ALCC was swamped with information and
didn't have time to pass updated ETA's or new station workloads.
We needed updated station workloads every 6 hours as fast as
things were changing. When fax machines were finally installed
in the MARC, ALCC never sent us any information.
Solution: Accelerate the C2IPS system so ALCE's have direct
access to the GDSS information. Until that time have everyone
use fax as much as possible since SAT DATA seeing to go down quite
often when the airways get saturated.
b. Problem: Too many offices were trying to use Desert
Storm as the proving grounds for their systems without doing all
of the coordination and support required to run their system. TR
section at Riyadh sent the RCAPS system to our location and
expected the ALCE to handle the support requirements of
commercial phone line and personnel to run the system. The ALCE
MARC had the only commercial line which was primarily used for
command and control in theatre and worldwide. We had to time
share this line which impacted our ability to talk to ALCC on
many instances.
Solution: Make sure all coordination and support for any system
has been done prior to installing-at a new location. The ALCE
doesn't have time to do the legwork for these systems. If the
ALCE commander says the system won't benefit his operation,
believe him.
c. Problem: Threat warnings were usually provided in a
timely manner prior to SCUD attacks, however the coordination and
communication between MAC and CENTAF were inconsistent. On
numerous occasions MAC would initiate a SCUD alert and our tent
city, who received alert warnings through CENTAF, wouldn't react
at all. This inconsistency could have cost us many lives!
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