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RECOMMENDATION Much more emphasis must be placed on the use-of secure
voice on tactical missions. -All tactical training missions SHould use
 secure voice. Annual check rides should evaluate aircrew knowledge and use
 of secure radio procedures. Install a VHF/FM compatible radio during the
 SCNS upgrade, or outfit tbe Army witb UBF radios. lf we are serious about
secure  voice, ensure all deployed aircraft have the capability. ALCC needs
 to procure better state-of-the art HF communications equipment and ensure
 operators are properly trained. Better coordination of COMSEC procedures
for all players in the theater is required. -

OBSERVATION:  Tactical airlift had such a low priority during the pre
 war and  air campaign tbat components of tbe Tactical Air Control SyGtem
 (TACS) bhd little time to work witb our aircraft. AWACS, ABCCC' and CRCs
 were generally busy working higher priority fighter resources and conse-
quently didn't have much timeto update airlift crews on current situation
al information. This waS not a show-stopper but tended to lull tbe controI
system  into an unfamiliar situation. For example, wben an 8 ship C-130
formation checked in for information on their ingress route through south-
 ern Iraq, ABCCC passed a mission abort code to the lead aircraft. After
 trying  to confirm with ALCC that the mission was canceled, it was discov
ered that it wasn't. ABCCC then realized they had confused tbe C-130
 formation for a flight  of fighters.

RECOMMENDATION: Airborne tactical control systems have access to real
time-intelligence data whicb could be valuable to tactical airlift crews,
 especially when ingressing enemy territory. Ensure tbat AWACS and ABCCC
are thoroughly informed of tbe mission-scenario On immediate requests for
airdrop/resupply, ALCC must ensure tbat the battlefield controI units are
well aware of the mission.  More interface between airlift and AWACS/ABCCC
during operational exercises and Red Flag/Cope Thunder would belp both
 sides  become better acquainted. Employing Airborne Command and Control
 proocedures during JBIC training would be anotber good avenue to pursue.
                                                          .

 OBSERVATION: All airdrops were briefed to be communication-out. In
actual practice, drop zone personnel (TAEO) attempted to give the formation
 VIRS instructions, however, prebriefed frequencies were not the same as
  those used by the aircrews. During daytime drops,[(b)(l) sec 3.4 b(4)] were used
to mark the the point of impact. Unfortunately, all friendly Army vehicIes
  surrounding the DZ also carried an [(b)(1)sec(b)(4)]  on their hood or top of the
vehicles for fighters to easily  distinguish as friendly. This greatly
 confused the  aircrew as they tried to acquire the actual impact point among
all the vehicles and panels.

RECOMMENDATION: The method for controlling airdrops should be dictat-
 ed by thee tactical situation. Since tbere was no communication jamming,
  the threat was low, and visibilities were reduced, VIRS should have been
considered as secondary if the crew failed to acquire the drop zone on tbe
 first pass.   A signal other than [(b)(1)sec(b)(4)]   should have been -used for
 the vehicles.

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