MEDICAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 970207_aadcd_013.txt
Page: 013
Total Pages: 17

              j. Additional Support elements

                  (1) Observation: The members deployed to form the 5th
                  TAC ASF were poorly equipped to construct and operate a
                  field camp in the middle of the desert

                  (2) Discussion: No AFSC's necessary to construct and
                  maintain a field camp were part of the unit.
                   Fortunately we had some personnel deployed with needed
                   civilian experience who were able to help construct and
                   maintain physical facilities. For example, by sheer
                   luck, one Mental Health Technician (914X0) had some
                   generator/power production experience. Without this
                   person we would not have had power for two weeks after
                   arriving.

                  Many of the medical and administrative technicians were
                  utilized as the security force for the camp at Al
                  Jubail. Twenty four hour security meant that even with
                  rotation, a few of our technicians got little or no
                  training in their AFSC.
 
                  (3) Recommendation: A prime beef team, radio
                  operators and a contingent of guards Should augment ar 
                  APSS .

              k. Meals

                 (1) Observation: The 5th TAC ASF received its meal
                  support from a Marine dining hall twenty five minutes
                  away from the compound. Meals were often cold, i11
                  prepared and lacked variety.

                  (2) Discussion: Lack of adequate nutritional meals
                  contributed to poor health of staff members. Many
                  staff members ate "junk food" further contributing to
                  poor nutrition.

                  (3) Recommendation: A field kitchen with personnel
                  properly trained in its operation should be part of the
                  package for any group of more than two hundred
                  individuals.

       (10) COMMANDER SUMMARY

       None of the deficiencies that have been noted were serious enough
       to affect operations although they may have made some people's
       jobs more difficult to perform. I feel that the above
       deficiencies can be worked out if serious effort is made  to
       correct these situations for future operations if the "HUB''
       concept of aeromedical evacuation operations is tc  continue.  


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