Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM - Environmental Health Experience

File: 970207_aadch_016.txt
Page: 016
Total Pages: 46

             
             3. The language barrier was the major inhibitor of EH
        efforts to educate local national foodhandlers about USAF
        sanitation and hygiene standards.

            4. Food delivered to on-base feeding facilities by local
        national food vendors could not be inscected at destination in
        most cases because the food was not government owned or purchased
        and because EH was not kept informed about the deliveries. EH
        efforts to get involved in destination inspection of foods were
        effective in a very few cases. This effort was not aggressive in
        every case.

              5. Commander support of EX recommendations for the
        prevention of foodborne illness was not obtained in some cases.
        Troop morale sometimes received a higher priority (i.e. hot meals
        served under less than s-atisfactory conditions preferred over
        MREs).

              6. The inspection reporting system used during peacetime was
        not employed at all deployed bases. EH did not, in every case,
        actually assign ratings to inspection reports (i.e.
        "unsatisfactory") and did not rout inspection reports through
        Wing Commanders. Commander support and food service officer
        responses to deficiencies might have been more aggressive if EH
        had used the standard reporting system which was well established
        and used during peacetime operations.

             7. In many cases, a daily record of menus was not kent by
        the feeding facilities. Epidemiologic investigations were
        hampered by the lack of feeding facility menus to refer to during
        patient interviews.

             8. Definitive diagnoses of AGE cases could not be made in
        some cases because clinical laboratory supcort was not readily
        available. Early identification of the pathogen may have
        significantly enhanced epidemiologic investigations and
        treatment.

             9. Detailed reports of foodborne illness investigations were
        not written and/or forwarded to USCENTAF/SG. This deficiency
        represents a missed opportunity during the deployment to share
        information between bases and to educate food managers and
        commanders. Detailed reports would also have enhanced post-
        deployment analysis of the foodborne illness risks associated
        with Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

            10. EH training during Operational Readiness Exercises did
       not include structured food safety tasks. EH personnel were not
       well prepared to conduct, nor were ATH Commanders well acquainted
       with, EH foodborne illness prevention tasks in a barebase
       setting.