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File: 092396_aug96_decls11_0009.txt
Subject: MEDICAL OPERATIONAL
Box ID: BX000511
Document Number: 10
Folder Title: D-S SPEC STUDIES PROJECT GENERAL OFFICER STEERING COMMITTEE
Folder Seq #: 7
Unit: ARCENT
Parent Organzation: CENTCOM
ISSUE: Deficiencies in organization, materiel, leader
development and/or training adversely affected the Army medical
Department (AMEDD) Command and Control (C2) function.
DISCUSSION:
a. Deficiencies in the organization, materiel leader
development and/or training for executing the AMEDD C2 function
existed at every level. Lack of communications capability was a
common deficiency at all levels. Medical units throughout the
force lacked the quality and quantity of radio communications
required to effectively execute the C2 mission. The problem was
both a shortage of authorized equipment and insufficient
quantities on authorization documents. Shortages included
communications security equipment. Corps level units, even of
company size, frequently have support elements deployed across a
broad front or in such depth that there is a need for a
communications link with each subordinate element to effectively
perform the C2 mission. Corps medical battalions and medical
groups always have this requirement and have no more robust
communications than some companies. There are additional
requirements in medical groups, brigades and Corps hospitals to
communicate information critical to patient regulating, medical
supply and the blood program. The Theater Army Medical
Management Information System (TAMKIS) requires the AN/GRC 193A
Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR) and ancillary equipment to
be an effective system. The equipment is not authorized in most
units which caused problems in fielding and use of TAMMIS in the
Theater. The paucity of communications equipment in medical
units also caused delays in receipt of evacuation missions and
dispatching resources to accomplish the mission. C2 headquarters
ehicles or redundancy in other equipment to
establish a jump tactical operations center or to provide
adequate C2 on the move. Both capabilities were required to
support the fast long ranging offensive operations of Operation
DESERT STORM.
b. The Army Medical Department is the only organization that
requires a change of command in units during critical operations.
AMEDD policy dictates that a physician command any unit that
provides direct patient care. The commander requirement on
Tables of organization and Equipment (TOE) for forward support
medical companies in the Division Support Command, Corps medical
clearing companies and Corps hospitals is for a Medical Corps
officer. Modified TOEs authorize a Medical Service Corps officer
as the commander. Medical Service Corps hospital commanders are
selected through the Lieutenant Colonel command selection
process. Company commanders usually have experience from
multiple TOE unit assignments. Medical Corps commanders are
identified through the Professional Officer Filler System
(PROFIS), and seldom command a TOE unit prior to deploying for
contingency operations. Medical Corps officers are obviously
J-8
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Document 10 f:/Week-32/BX000511/D-S SPEC STUDIES PROJECT GENERAL OFFICER STEERING COMMITTEE/medical operational:09069614063528
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-32
Box ID = BX000511
Unit = ARCENT
Parent Organization = CENTCOM
Folder Title = D-S SPEC STUDIES PROJECT GENERAL OFFICER STEERING COMMITTEE
Folder Seq # = 7
Subject = MEDICAL OPERATIONAL
Document Seq # = 28
Document Date =
Scan Date = 17-AUG-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 06-SEP-1996