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File: 980227_sep96_decls2_0015.txt
Box ID = BX005616
Folder Title = 800TH MP BDE AAR 1 JUN 91
Unit = MISC
Parent Org = MISC
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 800th MP Bde Desert Shield/Storm
After Action Report
24. Issue: Undefined Support Chain-of-Command
Finding: Much confusion resulted from attempts to fulfill
support requests because of the shifting of support responsibili-
ties.
Discussion: The present command structure within Theater
consists of two Forward Corps, one Support Command, two active
Area. Support Groups, one Area Support Group in reserve, and one
Material Management center, all falling under a three command in-
frastructure composed of the CENTCOM, the ARCENT, and the SUP-
COM. The 800th Military Brigade, as an Echelon-Above-corp (EAc)
unit, doctrinally is to fall under the command of a PersCom.
There was no PersCom committed to the Theater, therefore, upon ar-
rival of the Brigade's advance party, the Brigade was assigned to
ARCENT Main under Brigadier General Frix. Meetings with the
A,RCENT G-4 identif iod the support requirements for the EPW
mission. Planning was initiated through the ARCENT G-4
Logistical operations. when the main body of the Brigade arrived
(25 December) , the Brigade was realigned under SupCom. The plans
and requirements identified to-date war* r*-submitt*d thru the
supcom logistical channels, where most were reject*d. DA Form
2765-ts were submitted to roqu*st materials not available thru
normal supply channels. upon initiation of hostilities and the
taking of EPWS. no supplies nor equipment to support the EPW
population were on-hand. Requests for *mergenc@- supplies to
support the EPWs were submitted and referred up to ArCent.
Henceforth, logistical functions were rarely worked thru the
SupCom Logstaff. Class ri (DA 3953) requests initiated with
Contracting were transferred directly to Contcom. The
inconsistent alignment of support responsibilities between the
three Commands made it dif f i&iilt to know through which channels
to process requests.
Recommendation: Regardless of what level Command the Bri-
qade is assigned, -a-&*ronce to that chain-of-co=and for all sup-
pt)rt and logistics is a must. Any intor-co=and coordination re-
quests should be accomplished by the higher headquarters logisti-
cal personnel, not by the Brigade G-4 Section. Most problems en-
sued because of a lack of a TAACOM and a TAMMC, which would have
boon responsible for defining and coordinating the logistical sup-
port'botwaon the ASGs and subordinate units. They would also
have provided one centralized registry of all equipment in The-
ater.
N-15
Annex N (Logistical Support) to 800th MP Bde Desert Shield/Storm
After Action Report
24. Issue: Undefined Support Chain-of-Command
Finding: Much confusion resulted from attempts to fulfill
support requests because of the shifting of support responsibili-
ties.
Discussion: The present command structure within Theater
consists of two Forward Corps, one Support Command, two active
Area. Support Groups, one Area Support Group in reserve, and one
Material Management center, all falling under a three command in-
frastructure composed of the CENTCOM, the ARCENT, and the SUP-
COM. The 800th Military Brigade, as an Echelon-Above-corp (EAc)
unit, doctrinally is to fall under the command of a PersCom.
There was no PersCom committed to the Theater, therefore, upon ar-
rival of the Brigade's advance party, the Brigade was assigned to
ARCENT Main under Brigadier General Frix. Meetings with the
A,RCENT G-4 identif iod the support requirements for the EPW
mission. Planning was initiated through the ARCENT G-4
Logistical operations. when the main body of the Brigade arrived
(25 December) , the Brigade was realigned under SupCom. The plans
and requirements identified to-date war* r*-submitt*d thru the
supcom logistical channels, where most were reject*d. DA Form
2765-ts were submitted to roqu*st materials not available thru
normal supply channels. upon initiation of hostilities and the
taking of EPWS. no supplies nor equipment to support the EPW
population were on-hand. Requests for *mergenc@- supplies to
support the EPWs were submitted and referred up to ArCent.
Henceforth, logistical functions were rarely worked thru the
SupCom Logstaff. Class ri (DA 3953) requests initiated with
Contracting were transferred directly to Contcom. The
inconsistent alignment of support responsibilities between the
three Commands made it dif f i&iilt to know through which channels
to process requests.
Recommendation: Regardless of what level Command the Bri-
qade is assigned, -a-&*ronce to that chain-of-co=and for all sup-
pt)rt and logistics is a must. Any intor-co=and coordination re-
quests should be accomplished by the higher headquarters logisti-
cal personnel, not by the Brigade G-4 Section. Most problems en-
sued because of a lack of a TAACOM and a TAMMC, which would have
boon responsible for defining and coordinating the logistical sup-
port'botwaon the ASGs and subordinate units. They would also
have provided one centralized registry of all equipment in The-
ater.
N-15
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