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File: doc04_16.txt
Narch 19, 1991
AFTER ACTION REPORT
4 LESSONS LEARNED
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ACCESS
OBSERVATION. Nedical intelligence was not accessed at the user
level making available medical intelligence essentially useless.
DISCUSSION. While a nwnber of products are produced by the Armed
Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFNIC), access to these
products is limited by distribution failures. These distribution
failures are the co-responsibility of the user and the producer.
First, the medical user does not know what is available or how to
access what is available. Second, AFMIC must take some
responsibility for the user not knowing what is available. This is
especially true the further down the Chain of Conmiand one goes.
a For instance, the medical team entering~did not have access
&`to or knowledge of an AF~IC produced Nedical Facilities
Guide until after they had assessed the city's facilities
themselves. At that point it was "too little - too late" and re-
enforced the teams view of medical intelligence as being useless.
There is essentially no "real time" medical intelligence at the
user level.
LESSON LEARNED. Access to medical intelligence is limited by
knowledge of what is available and how to ask for it.
RECONMENDED ACTION. AFMIC must make a concerted effort to educate
the medical user of its products and how to access these products.
It should be augmented in this task by the medical training
community (e.g. - the U.S. Army Academy of Health Sciences).
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