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File: doc04_16.txt
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                                                      Narch 19,  1991


                          AFTER ACTION REPORT


 4                          LESSONS LEARNED
                      MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE  ACCESS

   OBSERVATION.   Nedical intelligence was not accessed at the user
   level making available medical intelligence essentially useless.

   DISCUSSION.  While a nwnber of products are produced by the Armed
   Forces  Medical  Intelligence  Center (AFNIC),   access  to  these
   products is limited by distribution failures.  These distribution
   failures are the co-responsibility of the user and the producer.
   First, the medical user does not know what is available or how to
   access  what   is  available.    Second,  AFMIC  must  take   some
   responsibility for the user not knowing what is available. This is
   especially true the further down the Chain of Conmiand one goes.
a For instance, the medical team entering~did not have access
 &`to or knowledge of an AF~IC produced           Nedical Facilities
   Guide  until   after they   had assessed  the  city's  facilities
   themselves.  At that point it was "too little - too late" and re-
   enforced the teams view of medical intelligence as being useless.
   There is essentially no "real time" medical intelligence at the
   user level.

   LESSON  LEARNED.   Access to medical  intelligence is  limited  by
   knowledge of what is available and how to ask for it.

   RECONMENDED ACTION.  AFMIC must make a concerted effort to educate
   the medical user of its products and how to access these products.
   It  should  be augmented  in this  task by  the  medical  training
   community (e.g. - the U.S. Army Academy of Health Sciences).


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