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      At 1730, Task Force Papa Bear received additional guidance
from Division regarding preparations for the 26 February attack
to isolate and seize Kuwait International Airport.   1st Tanks
and 3/9 niade preparations for the ~ove north while CSSD-11
resupplied both battalions with ammo, food, and water.   By
1900, Task Force Log Trains had completed their ~ove to the
north side of the obstacle belt.

      By 0030, 26 February, the Task Force had completed ~oving
north to its new assembly area (vic QS 838968).   3/9 was the
furthest north, with 1st Tanks and the CP about 5 km southeast.
1/1 spent the night in the Burgan Oilfields and was to link-up
with the Task Force the following morning.

P~SE III:    ATTACK ON KUWAIT INTERNATI6NAL AIRPORT

      At 0800, Task Force Papa Bear, now the Division Reserve,
began moving north.   1/1 moved west along power lines to the
north of Al Burqan to link up with the remainder of the Task
Force (vic QT 8005).  The Task Force skirted the west side of
Al Burqan Oilfield, travelling between the 79 and 85
north-south gridlines.   Moving north through thick black clouds
of oily smoke, the Task Force passed scores of destroyed and
abandoned tanks, anti-tank guns, and armored vehicles.   The
Task Force moved in a wedge formation with 3/9 on the right,
1/1 abreast to the left, followed by 1st Tanks and Engineers.
At 1100, the Task Force reached Pt Red (QT 8020), and by 1300,
Papa Bear was located behind Pt Dianne.

      At 1330, Task Force Commanders met with the Coinmanding
General to finalize plans for the attack of ~uwait
International Airport.   Task Force Papa Bear was to isolate the
airport from the south and west, while TF Ripper blocked to the
northwest.   TF Shepherd was tasked with isolating the airport
from the east.   At 1430, the Task Force held an orders group to
issue the frag order to its subordinate units.   On order, 3/9
would lead across Pt Dianne with 1/1 in trace.   Once across Pt
Margaret, 3/9 would continue north and 1/1 would move east.
This would put 3/9 to the west of the runway, 1/1 south of the
runway, with 1st Tanks isolating the divided highway south of
1/1.   The Task Force also had a "be pre~ared" mission to clear
the airfield the next mornin~.

      At approximately i500, 1/11 reported taking incoming
chemical rounds.   Apparently, someone observed yellow smoke'
and mistook it for chemical agents.  The Task Force was placed
in MOPP 4 until the CAMS and FOX vehicle could verify the
absence of chemicals.   No chemical agents were detected and the
"all clear" was given approximately 10 minutes later.

      At 1615, TF Ripper re~uested assistance from TF Papa Bear
as its right flank unit (1/7) had become heavily engaged.
Division granted permission for Papa Bear to cross Pt Dianne in
order to relieve the Ira~i pressure on Ripper's flank.

    -~ At 1630, 3/9 moved out towards the airfield.  Visibility
was extrernely poor and oettin~ worse due to the heavy

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