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File: 970107_aug96_decls1_0032.txt
Page: 0032
Total Pages: 60

Subject: 8TH TANK BN  COMMAND CHRONOLOGY NOV 90 TO MAR 91  12 APR 91     

Unit: 8TH TANK BN 

Parent Organization: 2 MARDIV    

Box  ID: BX600007

Folder Title: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 8TH MARINES APRIL - JUNE 1990                                                

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         11





                                                                             UNCLASSIFIED


                      Marine Regiment and communications with Division cf,.a@eci iq@iilc
                      to Cnth Marines were activated.                      Once again tc- sl-Lppc,rt of,eratic,nis the cc,mpi
                      ,"Iatoort sttecessf i.L II y rq a i rat a i net r;kd i :, cc,mm Ltn i c,?,t i on s sulphur t for ttf P. AIph i
                      Command and Bray-) Command Combat Operati!-ins Center, the Logistics Operations
                      Center, and the Field Operation Center during Operation Desert
                       rd e r t,j                                                                  s cti@Dn       ai taimed three
                                    support wire c@)mmlinicati-@ns the wire                            e          m   n
                      tactical automated switching systems to support the Combat Operations Center,
                      the L,jgistics Op,aratic@ns Center,, and the Field O@,eratic@n Center during
                      Operation Desert Shield.                   Liai5c.ri was made with the Gt@t MariF)L, Cc,pir4Ltnic,.@.,tic,ris
                      Officer in order tc, discuss Lc.-iiimit@iicaticn policy.                              On 23 4'atiLtary, the-
                      Battalion conducted a night movement.
                                                                   I Feb 1991 - 'c8 Feb 1991
                            During this time peric,,.l emphasis v,@aF, on maintaining and                                                           e)4i.",Citig
                      communications in .-jrIJ2r to provide command and                                control for the Battalion
                      Commander, and to c,btair, esential r,F,f,,ratic@nal                             gLLidarice, itit,@lligericp. ti@,,Ii%,tes,
Prior to Olieraticii
                      Desert Stci%m, the unit skillfully prepared and                                  c,rganize?d the,. Battalic@ns
                                               e@Ijiipmetit irid personnel for the                     vital massacre to include the
                      ,Jesign of the AAVC--7 cc,mr4and and control vehicle tc- 51.tppc,rt ctperatic-nal,
                      intelligence and fire sltppc@rt links.                          In preparation for enemy electronic
                      counter measures, the platoon effectively trained its personnel in electronic
                                   counter measures.               Throughout Operation Desert Stcrm, SSgt Shawls
                      technical experience proved vital in maintaining operational
                      f@)r, the Bittaii!j@i,           Formally trained as a fifth echelon
                      technician, S-qgt c3i         Llaw Lxpedipritly made repairs that would nc-ripitlly deadline
                      equipment for 5everal Jays.                      His effirts were directly res@,c,nsiLIE@ for the
                      continual high combat readiness status for, cr,mrqlkriicatic.ris eq@tipmerit c!L@ririq
                      Operation Desert nK'Leli. Because @f his expertise in his Military
                      Occupational S.clecialty, gsgt Shaw reality prckided training and
                      assistance to other units within the Sth Marines t,) include; Combat En,@litlE-,er
                      Battal4c,n, '17nd AAV I?attalic@n, @'nd Battalion, '@nd Marines, 4th                                                          , mrfl Is@
                      Battalion, 8t@i Marines. In preparAti@l@,. l'or Desert Storm, the cijirtrq personnel
                      en,jLErc,ci long ard@tc@Lis hours tc. er@,sLir,e the Battalions Cc,mmari@-I                                  Cc,r@tr,:,@
Ae t,) this consummate
                      atteritic,r% tc, aetail in preparing the Battalions commaLri,J aril control iy--tems,
                      the Battalion continually exercised effective command and control
                      communications during Operation Desert Stc-rm.                                   The net requirement frlr
                      Operation Desert Storm was; Regimental Ttit, 1, Regimental rac 2, Regimental TAC
                           Regimental Intel, Regimental FSC, Regimental Compiatid, Battalion Tac,
                      Battalion Adi'L,Dg, Tactical Air C,jnlrcl Party                                         TActipal qir Direction,
                      Tactical Air Re-ILkE@,,t/Fleic@ Request, Artillery Fire Dir-c?ctic,rt, @,.@irJ Artillery
                                        Fire. A total of 2 Hiu
                                                                            _jl-t Frequency (HF), I LJltra. High Freq,-Lericy
                             )t anci 10 Very High Frequency (VIIF) nets.                               Or, G-.Day
                                1 -if C,)mba@                          were jl-tt,.itatidi@ig ,        I'I)e Alpl-
                      .,-tpj),)r4                                                                                    a Ccmman,J C--7 c,:,wm
                                                      Capt Sole gi.tEtrJ;ng Regimental Tac 1,
                      Regimental Intel , LCpl Velazqi.tez QltAr,Jliig Fire support nets, and L-Cl-@l
                                      T(3P/WP       N.+            i-i me wis rqjn@ mal and seldom


                                                                           rhe                            Staffs insistence, c@,ci
                      effective lsi; echelon maintenance was a direct -esilt of the limitec                                                         4n I
                      failure during cc,robat c,ffensivl, c,peratic,n5 LFi@@'tririg reliable
ntrol communications for the Battalion.                                DAE? t,) the fluid and rlpi,4                        rr.,j V
                      c@ n t @l E, L-ttlef Pld, PLR' support was nc,n existi@r,,t.                            On the evetiin                        "4
                                  LI @         i             0                                                                      _q  Li ,        a
                      February, an Army vehicle strayed into an Iraqi minefield. Due to                                                 the
                      cc@mmi.inicatic@ns plat,,c-r. -2rgariizaticnal skills                              pi@.r@;crinells triiij-,4rjQ, @@te




                                                                             UNCLASSIFIED

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Document 60 f:/Week-34/BX600007/COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 8TH MARINES APRIL - JUNE 1990/8th tank bn command chronology nov 90 to mar 91:01029709504216
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-34
Box ID = BX600007
Unit = 8TH TANK BN
Parent Organization = 2 MARDIV
Folder Title = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 8TH MARINES APRIL - JUNE 1990
Folder Seq # = 11
Subject = 8TH TANK BN COMMAND CHRONOLOGY NOV 90 TO MAR 91
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-JAN-1997