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                                                          for                                      NBC Defense

                   The assui-nprion for operational planning was translated into a battalion requiring
                   preparation for "hasty' decontamination of 15-20 vehicles and MOPP exchange for
                   .ipl)f-oximately 200-250 personnels 3

                          (S) More subtle, yet significant, threats became concerns of I MEF during Desert
                   Shield. These were the unknown impact of accidental or tmorist release of industrial
                   chemicals from sizeable storage sites around the port city of Jubayl and the threat
                   associated with naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide gas and burning crude oil fumes
                   anticipated around ignited oil well heads. Fortunately the I MEF staff had a lieutenant
                   colonel with previous civilian work experience in the petroleum industry and a CNA
                   representative with a PHD in chen-dsrry. Although many contributed, the previous
                   men(ioned individuals were able to provide direct timely feedback to the MEF on the
                   nature of the significant industrial cheirdcal Ehreat.14

                          (S) Iraq's capabilities to wage cherrlical warfare was rapidly attlited once the air
                   campaign began. A preponderance of Fussein's delivery capability was in air delivered
                   bombs. With rapid domination of air space, and targeting of known production and
                   storage sites, reduced the means for Iraq to seriously damage ihe MEF with chemical
                   weapons. Air superiority significantly degraded Iraqi intelligence on Marine Corps unit
                   locations, further reducing risk from chen-dcal attack. By the end of January indications
                   were that the Iraqi threat was significantly reduced.

                          (S) Going into the ground war the principle concerns of the MEF G-3 were on
                   agent delivery from artiuery and Multiple Rocket Launcher (MPL) fire.    I5The MEF
                   expected and was concerned about chemical and biological agent use bur did not
                   believe a crippling blow was possible.. The MEF anticipated that if agents were used
                   damage would be limited to a task force or regiment. 16 Limited shelf- life predictions
                   for Iraqi chemical munitions and their inability to freely move and n-Lix agents for binary
                   murlitions added to the confidence of the MEF.

                          (S) The ground attack on 24 February, was extremely successful. - Marines
                   crossed the line of departure wearing chen@dcal protective overgarment, depending on

                       13@4CCLS Tape #342
                       1429 November 90, report from I MEF CNA rep to OIC, I MF-F 3rd CAG on Threat
                   I-'rom itelease of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area.
                       '-%ecret MSG 01060OZ JAN91 FM DM WASH DC, Iraq Potential for CW use as of
                   2S Jan 91
                       1628 May 91, discussion with I MEF NBC Officer FWD
                                                            Imi

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