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File: 970903_oct1_0023.txt
Page: 0023
Total Pages: 106








      NBC Defense



      leclini(lues were inefficient in the desert because of greater dispersion distanced and
      common battlefield noise, such as that from operating aircraft and heavy equipment    I
                                icer reported that metal on metal techniques and crank si,,ens
      I MEF (FWD) the NBC Off                                                           . A
      were not effecrive and the headquarters switched over to a powered Federal Alarm
      system. In maneuve- ur-its, a great reliance was placed on alarm through hand and arm
      signals and beeping of vehicle homs. Many NBC officers recommended that vehicles be
      equipped with alarm capability, just as they are with @oms.

            (S) Wan-iing and reporting of pending chemical attack or downwind hazards has
      always been a key role of NBC control center operations. In SWA control center
      operations ranged from elaborate setups at higher headquarters with full teams for
      plotting and reporting to operations where an NBC officer in the alpha or bravo
      conutiand group was required to perform all functions of calculating, plotting,
      predicting, and warning.

            (S) All front-line Marines were trained in agent identification and reporting
      possible contan-dnation using NBC-1 observer reports, to give time, location, and
      descriptive information on (he suspected attack to higher headquarters. Battalion NBC
      officers were responsible for taking this agent attack information, plotting downwind
      hazard fan, and warning of the hazard area to higher and adjacent units. with respect
      to ground operations, aU NBC officers interviewed stated that NBC messages were not                   t
      effectively received or transmitted by forward units during the offensive. Most all
      stated that the reason for poor NBC reporting was greatly due to a lack of a dedicated
      nets for NBC message traffic. NBC officers were typically monitoring the intelligence
      nees and not permitted direct access to tactical nets. AU NBC officers stated there was a
      great deal of confusion from the inability to obtain good follow-up on reported agent
      attacks because of communication lirairations. 7th Marines was able to develop an
      innovative solution to commur@cation of NBC warning messages. Using Position
      Location and Reporting System (PLARS), 7th Marines developed a simple coding system
      for transmission of NBC reports.

             (S) Conununication Hn-dtations also caused iiu'tial problems with obtaining  -
      weather and wind data for NBC officers to predict scope and duration of potential agent
      hazards. The Chemical Downwind Message (CDM) provides the basic weather data that
      allows for prediction of agent hazard fans once contamination is detected. Providing
      Chemical Downwind Messages (CDM's) for NBC control center operations to the
      regiment and below is docninauy a higher headquarters responsibility. An 'uu'tial
      concern of maneuver elements was the inability to obtain timely CDWs from higher
      headquarters during the ground offensive. NBC officers were forced to develop there
      own CDWs using field expedient meehods. Surprisingly, given the rapid local climatic
      changes in the desert, aU generauy felt more comfortable with their own CDM

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