File: 970903_oct1_0057.txt
Page: 0057
Total Pages: 106

NBC Defense

(U) A clear caree- progression for NBC officers to key staff billets has not been
established. Establishment of a career progression will insure they develop and
demonstrate the necessary suis to be effective professionally.

(S) 2. NBC Operations

(S) Current intelligence information on individual protective equipment
capability of the Iraqi's, was nor good. This is may indicate a need to increase emphasis
on human intelligence (HUMCNT) for this information.

(S) The threats posed by hydrogen sulfide, industrial chen-dcal storage and
burning crude oil, were sigriifican[ in the Marines sector. Evaluation of the industrial
chemical threat to Marines requires greater attention in future conflicts. If this mission
is determined to fall under the purview of NBC officer-s, serious consideration must be
given to their need for higher education in the areas of chemistry and toxicology. A
firm working knowledge of these areas would be essential to advising commanders.

(S) Warning and alarm systems are not standardized among the Se-vices or
effectively incorporated into training.

(U) Responsibility for plara@dng and management of warning and alarm systems
has not been clearly established in the Marine Corps.

(S) Standard NBC reporting procedures were not very effective during combat
operations in SWA because of ineffective communication.

(S) The M8AI detector did not perform well in SWA.

(S) The Fox NBC Reconnaissance vehicles proved valuable to conunanders by
rapidly confum-dng that agents were not present.

(S) The Fox was ineffective in monitoring for agents through the breach because:
it could not slow down to get good readings, it could nor stop in the breach and take
samples, and it was not allowed to go back and check breach areas that were thought
contan-dnated.

(S) The chen-dcal and biological sampling and chain of custody procedures for
confirmation of agent use and retaliation are flawed. These procedures were not well
planned or effectively exercised prior to the ground war. Procedures also appear to be
a failure because of the lack of feedback provided to 2d MARDIV from JCMEC on
properly collected samples.