S                                     U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


   The designation of MAGTFs as `,amphibious'1 rather than "expeditionary"
continued until 1988, when General Gray put things back the way they had
been, to reflect more accurately Marine Corps missions and capabilities.  Said
General Gray in explaining this change: "The Marine air-ground forces which
we forward deploy around the world are not limited to amphibious operations
alone.  Rather, they are capable of projecting sustained, combined arms combat
power ashore in order to conduct a wide range of missions essential to the
protection of our national security interests."
   For Operation Desert Shield,    if the 1st and 7th Marine Expeditionary
Brigades were to be deployed, as planned, by air, they would be taking virtually
nothing with them but their individual arms and equipment. 14 That would not
give them much combat potential.   It was expected that their heavy equipment
and supplies would be borne to the scene by the Maritime Prepositioning Force.
   In early 1980, then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown testified to the
Congress: "Although we can lift a brigade size force [by air] to the scene of a
minor contingency very quickly, that force would be relatively lightly armed
        To supply such a force by air with substantial mechanized or armored
support, along with necessary amlnunition, he went on, would occupy almost all
of DoD's airlift force.
   Dr. Brown's recommended solution to this problem was to preposition
squadrons of commercial ships at strategic locations, each squadron loaded with
most of a MEB's combat equipment and about 30 days of supply.
   Thirteen modern ships, with civilian crews, eventually were dedicated to this
concept.   By the summer of 1990, there were three Maritime Prepositioning
Shipping Squadrons in being: MPSRon-1 in the Atlantic, MPSRon-2 in the
Indian Ocean, and MPSRon-3 in the Western Pacific. 15 These ships did not
need ports; they could offload either at a pier or in the stream.  But they did
need a benign environment.    They were not a substitute for amphibious ships,
which have an assault capability.     Skeptics, among them many old-guard
Marines, questioned their usefulness.   It was dangerous, it was argued, to
separate a Marine from his pack. A marriage of men and material on a potential
battlefield was problematic.  Desert Shield would provide an acid test for the
MPS concept.
   On 8 August (C + 2), Maritime Prepositioning Shipping Squadron 2 sailed
from Diego Garcia-that speck of an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean--
and Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3 sailed from Guam.         Destination for
both squadrons was the Persian Gulf. MPSRon2 was to marry up with 7th MEB,
and MPSRon-3 with 1st MEB, if and when those two MEBs deployed.
   On 10 August (C + 3), CinCCent, that is, General Schwarzkopf, did indeed
call not only for the airlifted 1st and 7th MEBs but also for the seaborne 4th
MEB.    No two MEBs are exactly alike in structure; they are task~organized.
The size of a brigade can easily vary from 7,000 to 17,000 troops or more,
mostly Marines, but also a considerable number of Navy men, because the
Corps's medical support and its chaplains, plus some engineering help, come
from the Navy.