ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                       2S


Proceedings: What about the equipment coming off the ships?

Hopkins: We had no problems with the offload.    The pier facilities and the
airheads were great. We started to~move the AV-8Bs up to the King Abdul Aziz
Naval Air Station right in back of Jubayl so they would be responsive to the
front lines.  The F/A-18s were down at Shaik Isa in Bahrain.
   There were only about three or four defensible pieces of terrain between the
Kuwaiti border and Jubayl. I went up to Manifa Bay, which is about 70 miles
south of the Kuwaiti border. We decided to screen there with the light armored
vehicles, and then Colonel [now Brigadier General Carlton W.] Fulford could
deploy the mechanized units and the greater part of the Regimental Combat
Team by the cement factory, which was 40 miles north of Jubayl and 27 miles
or so south of Manifa Bay, where there was some relief in the desert.  It was
the best defensible terrain and Fulford deployed his Regimental Combat Team
there.
   That was our concept.    We would screen as far forward as possible, delay
and attrit the Iraqis with air power, then defend in a main battle area along what
became known as "cement ridge." The Iraqis had two possible attack routes.
We thought they'd either come down the coast or use a route a little bit to the
west, but both these routes come together at a junction near the cement factory.
If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in the sand by the cement factory.
We were going to stay there.

Proceedings: How soon were you ready?

Hopkins: 25 August. We were alerted on 8 August. The ships got there on 16
August.  We started bringing in the troops, and we probably could have been
ready a couple of days earlier if the air had gotten over sooner.
   We had the attack     helicopters, the Hueys, and the transports.      The
helicopters were coming in by Air Force C-5s.  We had them all. They were
coming in fine.
   But the fixed-wing was stalled at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Beaufort
and at MCAS Cherry Point.     The Air Force didn't give us the tankers ~~Lt we
needed to get across the Atlantic.   That was my biggest concern, because
basically the concept calls for us to be combat ready in about ten days.   We
were ready on the ground, with the MEB declared combat ready on 25 August;
but the FIA-18s didn't arrive until around the 23rd, because they were delayed.
The Air Force was moving its own aircraft, and that's one of the weaknesses of
the MPF concept--it's not tied together at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.
They've got to say, "Okay.   The ships are gone, but you also have tactical air-
craft to deploy." The aircraft need the same priority as the ground forces, and
they didn't get it.

Proceedings:    When  did   you first get some OV-10s,  either FLIR       [for-
ward-looking infrared radari-capable or for tactical air coordinator (airborne)
missions and radio relay?