ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                            27


   We were tied into all the command-and-control systems. We didn't have full
Marine air support yet, but we planned to plug in, send a mission, say, "Hey,
we need this." Central Command would have come through for us, and by 23
August Boomer was in Riyadh. I wasn't worried about getting air support.

Proceedings: Did you have any ground-based electronic warfare capability?

Hopkins: No, that was in the follow~n echelon. We didn't have radio battalion
Support going in, but we did eventually get that capability.

Proceedings: Where were you getting your battlefield intelligence?

Hopkins: We relied on Central Command pushing it down to us from Riyadh.
Talking with General Saleh on a daily basis tied in the Saudi Army side of it,
and I would talk with Bader.  But their intelligence was poor. We didn't really
have any intelligence except what was coming from Central Command, and it
painted an overpowering picture--we were facing 11 Iraqi divisions.        But this
was from a macro-viewpoint.
   Getting back to my earlier comment, intelligence was terrible. Later on after
the 7th MEB had been absorbed into I MEF, we were tracking the Iraqi 80th
Tank Brigade for months.    Because of the T-72 tanks, it was a major
threat--but it turned out that this unit wasn't in our sector after all. It had left
Kuwait months before and we didn't know it. The intelligence was not accurate.
They kept on building this guy to be a great fighter, great artillery; they had
barriers and mines; they're going to put oil into these obstacles and light it
off--and so forth.

Proceedings: Did you see any prisoners of war before the ground war started?

Hopkins: We never got any POWs until after the war started, and we got them
for ourselves.  The Saudis had the POWs and wouldn't let us interrogate them
to get the intelligence we needed.
   The Saudis picked up defectors. They took prisoners. But for the whole six
months of Desert Shield, right until we initiated the attack, the Saudis controlled
any defector who came across, and any POWS.    At our level, we never knew
whether we were getting any of that information.

Proceedings: What took most of your time while you commanded the brigade?

Hopkins: Planning.   Conducting liaison. Preparing the defense.  How we were
to be supported? All those things you need to give the tactical commander
exactly what he requires.   Making sure the operations order we had was good
tactically, that we tied in with the 82nd, that the Saudis knew exactly what we
were doing.   We worked those issues day in and day out.