ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                          29


Proceedings: Was 3/9 ticketed to go originally?

Hopkins: No, but we brought four battalions over. It happened that we had the
lift for four battalions instead of what we'd call a troop lift for three, so we had
four battalions. We constituted one of the battalions as a reserve, but that came
later.
   Here is how it all evolved.   One of the 7th's battalions--3/7--was on unit
deployment, but 1/5 had just come back from Panarna, so Fulford asked for 1/5
and Major General [John P.] Monohan [then commanding the              1st Marine
Division] said, "Fine.  Take 1/5." Remember, we still didn't know if 3/9 was
going to be turned around.   So we had 1/7, 2/7, and 1/5.      Then as we started
working the TPFDD, and because Fulford wanted to take as much as we could,
he asked Division to turn around 3/9, and we got them.       So the final bag was
1/7, 2/7, 1/5, and 3/9.
   We worked all the staffs in CAST.  We realized we could not do a standard
combined arms exercise but we've got a mobile assault course that ties in
artillery on a company level.  So we said, "Let's get everybody on the mobile
assault course that we can, tanks, amtracks, LAVs, and then we'll work the
infantry guys, zero their battle-sights, put them on the weapons ranges, and do
as much of that as we can." That's exactly what we did.
   I think that was a dynamite program. I think it raised the level of confidence
and maximized the opportunity that we had.        The units that were going to flow
first in the air lift went out to the field first.  As the time-phased deployment
unfolded, each one of the battalions got maximum opportunity to train before
leaving.

Proceedings: People may forget now about the chemical threat because it didn't
materialize.  Did you have all your gear at the time?

Hopkins: We took everything we had.    The intelligence guys knew the Iraqis
had a hell of an NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] capability, so we
brought all the gas masks, all the MOPP [mission-oriented protective posture]
gear. The British gear came later. We got anything we asked for.      The Marine
Corps turned to; DoD turned to; the industrial complex turned to.

Proceedings: Are you emphasizing anything different in training now that you're
back?

Hopkins: They caught us short in our mine-clearing capability, because we
hadn't worked with that.   The Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
California, went to battle stations, came up with some video tapes, brought them
on over, and we worked that.   But we started from ground zero in building up,
getting equipment.