ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLiOGRAPHY                                         33


  The secret is employment. Predeployment or deployment, we're going to get
there--but then some people lose track. The real question is what are you going
to do when you get there? Are you going to be combat effective? Do you know
how to do these things? I've always tried for balance. The deployment mode
is important. We've got to meet Transportation Command's requirements.      But
what we     get paid  for by the  American     people, Congress,   the    Com-
mander-in-Chief, and the JCS, is employment.   That's always my thing.
  I believe that a lack of human intelligence regarding Iraq and its capabilities,
(remember that Humint [human intelligence] was drastically cut at the national
level in the 197Os), put us at the mercy of the National systems.         These
photographic systems can't tell you enemy intentions, although they can do other
things well.   The intelligence information flow was terrible. We had to send
guys back to Washington to get photos three days before we went into the
minefields.
  We got terrific cooperation from the Saudis.   In any kind of operation like
this, you're going to have to spend a lot of time with the host country. In this
case, the host country is very sophisticated and you're the outsider, just walking
in there.  You have to do the right thing. It all worked out.