40                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


Proceedings: With the speedy resolution of the ground war, you bad to shift
gears rather quickly, to begin bringing all that material back home and putting
it back into shape.   What special challenges did you face during the equip-
ment-retrograde phase of the operation?

Brabham: The logistical driving factor during retrograde was to reconstitute our
maritime prepositioning ships program with prewar loads in those floating
storehouses, restoring that vital rapid-response capability to the nation as soon
as possible.  At the same time, we were trying to get our forces back home and
get their equipment cleaned up, to restore their readiness to deploy on short
notice.   It was truly a Marine Corps-wide effort, assisted by Headquarters
Marine Corps, Quantico, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific headquarters,
and the logistics bases at Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California.
    Such a massive relocation of forces and equipment takes a while, even under
the best conditions.  We had to support the pullout of the 1st Marine Division
and at the same time keep a 250-mile supply line open to the 2d Marine
Division, which would come out months later.     We probably were stretched as
much during that critical early phase of redeployment as we were at any other
time, trying to do everything at once.
    But the equipment is now back, and it's ready to go, although residual
cleanup efforts continue.  Training has resumed at our bases, and we have no
significant holes in our readiness or our capability to deploy again, when called.
When you consider the hard, round-the-clock use that much of the equipment got
for eight months, including combat, that's pretty phenomenal. And there are a
lot of wonderful people out there in the logistics system who made that happen.

Proceedings: Is there any question I haven't asked that you would like to
answer?

Brabham: The question I'm asked most frequently is, 1,What was the key to our
logistic success in Desert Storm? " That's a complex question, but I have a rather
simple answer: It's the educational level of our enlisted Marines and their
officers in our Corps today.  And 1 say that because the key to being able to do
what we did in the Gulf is the flexibility of the Marines involved.   The way to
meet those huge logistical demands is to flow your resources to the focus of
effort--the highest priority need at the time.   This requires flexibility, in the
form of intelligent, well-trained Marines who can be retrained on the spot and
shift from one skill to another to meet the next week's demand.         Today's
Marines can adjust that way, and they can make decisions on their own to
accomplish their missions, even though they may be 250 miles away from their
bosses.   In my view, that kind of flexibility goes straight back to education.

Proceedings: As the new head of education and training at Quantico, you now
have a chance to put that theory into practice.

Brabbam: I sure do.