ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBHOGRAPHY                                         51

desperate for a touchdown at the very end, what he does is he sets up behind the
center, and all of a sudden, every single one of his receivers goes way out to
one flank, and they all run down the field as fast as they possibly can and into
the end zone, and he lobs the ball.  Jn essence, that's what we did.
   When we knew that he couldn't see us any more, we did a massive
movement of troops all the way out to the west, to the extreme west, because
at that time we knew that he was still fixed in this area with the vast majority
of his forces, and once the air campaign started, he would be incapable of
moving out to counter this move, even if he knew we made it.       There were
some additional troops Out in this area, but they did not have the capability nor
the time to put in the barrier that had been described by Saddam Hussein as an
absolutely impenetrable tank barrier that no one would ever get through. I
believe those were his words.
   So this was absolutely an extraordinary move. I must tell you, I can't recall
any time in the annals of military history when this number of forces have
moved over this distance to put themselves in a poSition to be able to attack.
But what's more important, and I think it's very, very important that I make this
point, and that's these logistics bases.  Not only did we move the troops Out
there, but we literally moved thousands and thousands of tons of fuel, of
ammunition, of spare parts, of water, and of food out here in this area, because
we wanted to have enough supplies on hand so if we launched this, if we got
into a slugfest battle, which we very easily could have gotten into, we'd have
enough supplies to last for 60 days.    It was an absolutely gigantic accomplish-
ment, and I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and the transporters who
were able to pull this off, for the superb support we had from the Saudi
government, the literally thousands and thousands of drivers of every national
origin who helped us in this move out here.    And of course, great credit goes
to the commanders of these units who were also able to maneuver their forces
out here and put them in this position.
   But as a result, by the 23d of February, what you found is this situation.
The front lines had been attritted down to a point where all of these units were
at 50 percent or below.  The second level, basically, that we had to face, and
these were the real tough fighters we were worried about right here, were at-
tritted to someplace between 50 and 75 percent.     Although we still had the
Republican Guard located here and here, and part of the Republican Guard in
this area--they were very strong, and the Republican Guard up in this area,
strong; and we continued to hit the bridges all across this area to make
absolutely sure that no more reinforcements came into the battle. This was the
situation on the 23d of February. (Map 3)
   I shouldn't forget these fellows. That SF stands for Special Forces. We put
Special Forces deep into the enemy territory. They went out on strategic recon-
naissance for us, and they let us know what was going on out there. They were
the eyes that were out there, and it's very important that I not forget those folks.
   This was the morning of the 24th.     Our plan initially had been to start over
here in this area, and do exactly what the Iraqis thought we were going to do,
and that's take them on head-on into their most heavily defended area.   Also,