64                                   U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSiAN GULF, 1990-1991


    Q.   Can you tell us why the French, who went very fast in the desert in the
first day, stopped in Salman and were invited to stop fighting after 36 hours?
    A:   Well, that's not exactly a correct statement. The French mission on the
first day was to protect our left flank. What we were interested in was making
sure we confined this battlefield--both on the ~jg~~ and the left--and we didn't
want anyone coming in and attacking these forces, which was the main attack,
coming in from their left flank. So the French mission was to go out and not
only seize Al Salman, but to set up a screen across our left flank, which was ab-
solutely vital to ensure that we weren't surprised. So they definitely did not stop
fighting.  They continued to perform their mission, and they performed it ex-
traordinarily well.

    Q.   when Iraq's air force disappeared very early in the air war, there was
speculation they might return and provide cover during the ground war.     Were
you expecting that? Were you surprised they never showed themselves again?
    A:   I was not expecting it. We were not expecting it, but I would tell you
that we never discounted it, and we were totally prepared in the event it
happened.

    Q.   Have they been completely destroyed? where are they?
    A:   There's not an airplane that's flown. I'll tell you where they are. A lot
of them are dispersed throughout civilian communities in Iraq.  We have a lot
of indications--we have proof of that, as a matter of fact.

    Q.   How many divisions of the Republican Guard now are you fighting, and
any idea how long that will take?
    A:   We're probably fighting on the order of... there were a total of five of
them up here.    One of them we have probably destroyed yesterday.          We
probably destroyed two more today. I would say that leaves us a couple that
we're in the process of fighting right now.

    Q.   Did you think this would turn out, I realize a great deal of strategy and
planning went into it, but when it took place, did you think this would turn out
to be such an easy cakewalk as it seems? And secondly, what are your im-
pressions of Saddam Hussein as a military strategist? (Laughter)
    A:   Ha.
    First of all, if we thought it would have been such an easy fight, we
definitely would not have stocked 60 days' worth of supplies on these log bases.
As I've told you all for a very, very long time, it is very, very important for a
military commander never to assume away the capabilities of his enemy. When
you're facing an enemy that is over 500,000 strong, has the reputation they've
had of fighting for eight years, being combat--hardened veterans, has a number
of tanks and the type of equipment they had, you don't assume away anything.
So we certainly did not expect it to go this way.
    As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a
strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is he a tactician, nor is