ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                        111


As Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Lieutenant General Moore
commanded all Marine aircraft assigned to I Marine Expeditionary Force.     In
this interview, he discusses the significant aspects ofMarine Corps air operations
during Desert Storm, including the effectiveness of air control and planning
measures, the peiformance of various types of aircraft, and the role of Marine
Aviation in intelligence collection.

Marine Air:         There When Needed

interview with Lieutenant General Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991.


Proceedings: The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept has
been controversial and dates at least to the single-manager concept in Vietnam.
As Marine air built up over the months, how did the JFACC concept work?
What are your opinions on the air tasking order (ATO)?

Moore: [Lieutenant] General Charles A. Homer [U.S. Air Force, the JFACC],
Vice Admiral Stan Arthur [commanding naval forces], and General Boomer are
reasonable individuals.  When reasonable men come to a course of action, they
can work out reasonable solutions. Yes, it wasn't always right with doctrine on
either side, either green doctrine or blue doctrine, but we made it work. [See
"Stop Quibbling: Win the War," Proceedings, December 1990, pages 38-45.]
   The JFACC process of having one single manager has its limitations, as does
every system.  It does not respond well to a quick-action battlefield. If you're
trying to build a war for the next 72 to 96 hours, you can probably build a
pretty good war.  But if you're trying to fight a fluid battlefield like we were
on, then you need a system that can react.
   The JFACC process can't do that if you're talking about command.          If
you're talking about general control or, more important, if you're talking about
coordination, which is really what the commander-in-chief [CinC] wants, along
the correct course of action and in accord with his guidance, then that's exactly
what the process did out there in the battlefield. We coordinated the process so
that General Homer knew where I was going, knew where the Navy was going,
and obviously knew where he was going.     The effort was focused where the
CinC wanted it.   When he wanted to change that effort, he would shift the
weight, and we all responded.
   We, in essence, had control of the air space over our Marines much as you
would have a ground area of operations.            We called them high-altitude
reservation areas, and as we moved forward, we would uncover the air space
over our Marines that we needed to influence the battle.