ANTHOLOGY AND ANN~ATBD BIBLIOGRAPHY                                       115

Proceedings: How good was your intelligence support during the Gulf War?

Moore: No commander is happy with the intelligence support he receives, you
can never get enough.  Having said that, the intelligence folks did a fair job.
There are some major difficulties that we have within the Marine Corps with
regard to intelligence support, that we're taking a very hard look at now.
   We also need to take a look at our national assets--the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency-40 see that information gets to the
individual commanders.  Schwarzkopf told Congress that he was very unhappy
with the intelligence support that he received.
   Let me cite an example.      Two days prior to the beginning of the actual
ground campaign, we finally got pictures of the actual minefield breaching sites
brought to us by two officers-~ne from the 1st [Marine] Division, one from the
2d [Marine] Division--we had sent to Washington.    That ought to tell you that
the flow of information just wasn't there. I am sure that CinCPac [Commander
in Chief,  Pacific], CinCLant    [Commander    in Chief, Atlantic], and other
commands had a lot of great photos, but they weren't getting to us.
   One of the major shortfalls was the photo-type intelligence and the verbiage
that accompanied them.  It never got any better.
   We also had elaborate prototype systems like the Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS]. The idea offers potential, but we could
not make any tactical decisions based on its output. It was in early development
during the Gulf War and had an enormous slewing problem.    Frequently, when
we sent an aircraft to v&ify possible targets detected by JSTARS, the targets
turned out to be Coalition forces on the move.  We have a lot of work to do in
intelligence and the flow of intelligence before we step off in another operation
like this.

Proceedings: What provided your most reliable intelligence?

Moore: Our own aircraft supplied us with our best intelligence.   We had 177
airplanes at Shaik Isa, both Air Force and Marines, and some Air National
Guard RFACs.     I retired the last Marine Corps RF~B two days before I left
California in August 1991.     We looked very hard at bringing those RF~Bs
back; we just could not do it.  But we had the same old problem of getting that
information to the squadrons.    It had to go up through the Central Command
and back down through it.  By the time it did that, it was no longer valuable.

Proceedings: We have heard from some infantrymen that they depended on the
OV-1O, particularly the OV-10D with the forward-looking infrared [FLIR]
system out there at night to look out for them. Could you comment on that?

Moore: The grunts always love the OV-10, but they're picking the wrong
airplane.   The intelligence they were getting was from the F!A-18D that
operated deep into the battlefield.  It is true I kept the OV-10s up there, but I
did this primarily so that any ground commander who got into trouble could use