134                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 19901991


Proceedings: How about at night? We've heard that some units relied on the
OV-t0Ds with forwardAooking infrared IFLIR] systems or F/A-l8Ds with a
FLiR--General Moore said it was usually the F/A-l8Ds that came up with
intelligence at night.

Myatt: It was the F/A-I SD, because the OV-10s, being so vulnerable, stood
back so far south of the fire Support coordination line [FSCL].  I don't believe
they were players after about five days into the air campaign.

Proceedings: Did you use them for airborne radio relay?

Myatt: We thought that they could do that.       There's supposed to be an
automatic retransmission capability. It never worked for the UHF frequencies,
and was Spotty for the VHF frequencies.

Proceedings: Were pilot reports a good source of intelligence?

Myatt: Yes.    The pilots actually became so familiar with what I would call the
MEF zone of action after they had been flying over it for three weeks, that they
were able to sit down with my commanders and talk about what they had seen
and what we were going to face.     That is much more valuable to me than any
kind of written report.  The paperwork would have overwhelmed us, so the
personal contact--when General Moore would send his folks out--was invaluable.
   I remember he sent a couple of Harrier guys out, because the Harriers were
put in direct Support of the 1st Marine Division, while the FlA-iSs supported
the 2d Marine Division for the operation.  Of course the F/A-i SDs supported
both divisions.  There is no substitute for the pilots actually coming down and
talking to my folks. That ought to be standard operating procedure.

Proceedings: What was Task Force Troy?

Myatt: A lot of people talked about how the plan changed over the course of
time.  I said nobody ought to be apologizing for that, because the enemy
situation changes, and so you have to update your estimate of the situation.
   We tried to deceive the Iraqis and create a lot of ambiguity as to where and
when we were coming.      Task Force Troy was the deception task force put
together under General Tom Draude's [the 1st Division's assistant commander]
tutelage, and he actually worked for the MEF--he was the brains behind this.
At one point, we were going to put them up in what we call the Elbow, where
the Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border changes from a north--south to a more westerly
direction. That's the closest point to Kuwait City, by the way, a very sensitive
area to the Iraqis, and we knew that.
   As the plan changed, we would move Troy around for what we called the
ambiguity phase.   There was a whole series of ambiguity operations, including