44                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULl', 1990-1991

allies had not envisioned defending the immediate border area and had vacated
Khafji and established a defensive line south of the town. By doing so, the intent
was to create a buffer zone in which any Iraqi advance would be engaged by
supporting arins  fire. The  continued flow of information from the two
reconnaissance teams to division headquarters, 3d Marines, and the Saudi Army
National Guard command post fueled a determination to somehow retrieve these
Marines.
    For the second time in two days, General Myatt had a crisis on his hands.
The reconnaissance teams believed they could remain undetected for 36 to 48
hours, but reported enemy soldiers on all sides. The two teams and Myatt knew
that ultimately the Iraqis were bound to discover the Marines. Yet, there was
little Myatt could do to directly influence events. Kbafji was in the Saudi Army
zone and its tactical significance was insufficient to warrant jeopardizing the
Allied coalition by a unilateral Marine attack. Yet, there were ways in which
General Myatt could infiuence developments.
    The largest Marine unit in the area was Task Force Taro. !ts extensive cross
training efforts with the Saudi National Guard brigade under Colonel Turki had
created a bond between the two units which gave Colonel Admire access to its
commander. Both Colonel Turki and Colonel Admire envisioned that Task Force
Taro would operate with coalition forces if the Iraqis ever launched an attack on
Mishab. The lack of significant pressure against the western police posts enabled
General Myatt to concentrate Task Force Taro and its attached artillery battalion
in support of a Saudi attack. Colonel Admire's offer of infantry and artillery
support was enough to gird Saudi resolve to retake the town. The Saudis viewed
it as a matter of honor to save the reconnaissance teams, furthermore the Saudi
government also found the Iraqi occupation of a Saudi town intolerable and
ordered their commanders to attack.
    On 30 January 1991, while the Iraqis consolidated their position at Khafji,
Colonel Admire and his staff conferred with Arab commanders to develop plans
for a counterattack. Colonel Admire later confessed that limiting himself to a
supporting role was the most difficult decision he, as regimental commander,
ever had. On the one hand, he had devoted his entire career for an opportunity
to execute a decisive attack. The recapture of an enemy held objective would
validate the months of arduous training and preparations by 3d Marines. The
task force was eager for the opportunity. Yet, he also saw that the retaking of
KhaFji was an opportunity to demonstrate the confidence 3d Marines had in the
abilities of its Arab allies.
    General Myatt understood the situation and supported Colonel Admire's
deference to Arab commanders. Though Marine units moved in proximity to
the assaulting Arab battalions, the Saudis planned and conducted the main attack
using their armored and mechanized forces. Task Force Taro providerl anti-
armor detachments, infantry security forces, air and naval gunfire liaison teams,
and crucial artillery and air support. By mid-day, the Saudis had completed
planning and initiated the assault. It began with a night probing attack to
determine Jraqi dispositions and reactions. The attack proceeded as planned,
though not without some initial confusion. Nevertheless, the engagement went