48                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

infantry, tank, and mounted battalions, which long before dispensed with all
tentage except for their command and control centers, simply suffered that
exposure as they had the heat months earlier. As each day in February passed,
Marines got progressively more weathered in appearance and noticeably thinner.
   The long anticipated offensive was about to happen. Marines could see the
unceasing columns of vehicles moving supplies to Kibrit and Al KIlanjar. There
was scarcely a moment when the noise from fighter/attack aircraft flying to or
returning from bombing Iraqi targets in Kuwait could not be heard.7s     The
division command and control center became increasingly active as General
Myatt and his staff worked with task force and battalion staffs in a series of
planning meetings, operations briefs, and commanders' conferences.
   As G-Day (the commencement of the allied ground offensive) approached,
Major General Myatt was confident of his division's ability to defeat the enemy.
The division totaled 19,505 Marines and Navy personnel.77  Repeated training,
drills,  and  exercises prepared individuals and units to  react quickly and
correctly. Between 1 January and 20 February, for example, the 3d Tank
Battalion, Task Force Ripper, participated in eight major training events or
exercises.     At  the division headquarters level, sandtable  exercises and
commanders'    conferences insured division-wide understanding    of General
Myatt's intentions and updated commanders on changes and adjustments to the
offensive plan. The most notable sandtable brief occurred on 20 February.
Attendees    included every battalion commander,   their  S-3s,  forward air
controllers, and other principal officers, as well as Major General Royal N.
Moore, Jr., commanding the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.79
   Most of the equipment Myatt requested had arrived. In particular, the 1st
Combat Engineer Battalion had the tanks with mine plows, Mine Clearing Mine
Charges (single shot), MK154 (three shot line charges), fascine-equipped assault
amphibious vehicles, and armored bulldozers necessary to conduct breaching
operations and push through obstacles that might be encountered. The division
G-4, Colonel Lilley, considered the level of supplies within the division high
enough to meet most contingencies. In spite of difficulties over allocations of
certain types of ammunition, each task force and artillery battalion had sufficient
ammunition, fuel, and food to sustain several ~lays of intense fighting without
outside help. Nevertheless, the combat service support detachments of the Direct
Support Command were well stocked and tied in with the task forces.80
   General Myatt had also done everything in his power to shape the battlefield.
Intelligence sources indicated that deception operations were successftilly keeping
Iraqi forces in place along the entire border and seemingly unaware of the
division's point of attack. When he finally got detailed aerial photographs and
a ground reconnaissance of Iraqi defenses in front of the division just days
before the attack, he saw no sign of any last-minute enemy preparations. If
anything, the photographs showed Iraqi defenses to be less formidable than
originally believed. Intelligence also indicated that psychological operations
(PsyOps), principally in the form of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts across
the border, were destabilizing Iraqi units. Gradually, widespread desertion and
low morale weakened the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait. The enemy's poor showing