WrrH THE 1ST MARiNE DIVISION iN DESERT SHiELD AND DESERT STORM             63


determined to have been a HARM missile homing in on the radar transmission,
it destroyed the HMMWV carrying the radar, killed the operator, wounded
another Marine, and caused numerous secondary explosions from ammunition
stored in the vehicle. `~~ At first, the damage and casualties appeared to be much
worse than they actually were, but the suddenness of the destruction reminded
all that they were at war and not on an exercise.
   A half hour later, Task Force Taro began infiltrating the first obstacle belt.
Once past the minefield the 3d Battalion adopted a wedge formation and
immediately started moving north. The wedge formation reflected the lack of
knowledge of what enemy defenses lay ahead. Company I took the lead, while
Company K fell in on the right and Company L on the left. The 2d Battalion
moved in trace of 3d Battalion. An LAl screen preceded the infantry in the
formation. Aside from Company K encountering an unexpected minefield, the
march went as scheduled. The LAl screen came across an enemy bunker
complex and ammunition storage site. Then they caine within sight of the
burning well heads from the Al Wafrah Oilfield. Awe-struck by the flaming
landscape, they found undetonated explosive charges at undamaged wells and
other evidence of a hurried Iraqi withdrawal.
   By the late evening of 23 February, the division successfully met and
overcame the first major hurdle of the ground offensive. Task Forces Grizzly
and Taro were through the minefields on their way to assigned blocking
positions. They suffered few casualties and met only light enemy resistance.
Both Colonel Fulford and Colonel Hodory listened to Grizzly and Taro's reports
to General Myatt. They grew equally hopeful that the main attack might also
proceed against little opposition and get quickly past the suspected fire sack
between the two obstacle belts. Task Force Ripper received a tangible sign of
the favorable turn of events when, at 1735, forward observers from the 1st
Battalion, 7th Marines, captured 20 Iraqi soldiers in two trucks. Colonel Hodory
started Task Force Papa Bear's movement with the dispatch of two scout teams
to reconnoiter the route to the first obstacle belt.
   The Marines of Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear spent the day on last-
minute preparations for offensive operations. In the  1st Combat Engineer
Battalion detachment attached to Task Force Papa Bear, the day started with a
breakfast of MREs (either cooked or not according to individual            preference).'~~
A unit formation followed and the detachment commander, Major Joseph I.
Musca,  used it as an opportunity to explain to his Marines their part in the
history-making event that was about to happen. Religious services came next,
but they competed with the distribution of the field mess's excess desserts. At
0900, the detachment's operations officer, Captain Patrick J. Dunne, conducted
a sandtable exercise covering the crucial first day's operation. The exercise
lasted almost two hours, then each Marine returned to his vehicle, ate lunch,
went over equipment one final time, napped, or listened to the radio for news
of the latest diplomatic efforts. In many respects, the combat engineers prepared
just as they had for earlier tactical exercises. Yet, on this occasion they removed
all personal items and unnecessary equipment and put them on supply and
administrative vehicles. These activities proceeded quietly and, as each section