WITH THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM             67


                                     -      JA *~,


                                           Drawing by Sgt Charles 0. 0mw, USMC
                  Crossing into Kuwait, 24 Februa,y 1991.

it did not want to risk communications problems arising from frequency or
cryptographic changes occurring in the middle of a fast-paced offensive.
   What General Myatt did not want was a last-minute alteration to the 1St
Marine Division offensive plan. Yet, just after dawn on 23 February he faced
precisely that situation. Task Force X-Ray had been at its assembly area for two
days fully ready to conduct the planned helicopter assault scheduled for the early
afternoon of 0-Day (24 February). Few helicopters ever arrived        and  all
indications supported a growing belief that the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d
MAW) could not support the insertion of an entire battalion because too many
helicopters had been diverted to Support medical evacuation and logistical
resupply missions. Only enough aircraft remained to transport the battalion
command group and one company. With no other aircraft available General
Myatt revised his scheme of maneuver. Task Force X-Ray's alternate command
group and Companies B and C returned to Task Force Taro and General Myatt
ordered the assault made by the antitank-equipped Company A and the main
command group. If the first day's ground attack by Task Forces Ripper and
Papa Bear went according to schedule, Colonel Fulford and Colonel Hodory
merely needed to adjust battalion frontages to counter the loss of Task Force
X-Ray's two companies.