WITH THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM               71


force and fired. A short and sharp discussion between Colonel Fuiks and
Colonel Fulford ensued and that stopped the engagement.
   The incident affected the pace of offensive operations. General Myatt directed
each commander to maintain close and constant communication between the task
forces to ensure positive identification before firing.117  The combination of
extreme range, poor visibility, geographic disorientation, excited gunners, and
rapidly moving units led to increased possibilities of more      "friendly fire"
engagements. Concern over friendly fire incidents curbed free maneuver during
the day and unit movement at night.
  Task Force Grizzly continued towards its blocking position, an area of high
ground known as Hill 191. Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, spearheaded
the task force. A scout team mounted in llMMWVs preceded the company by
500 meters and the 2d Battalion followed behind the 3d Battalion. At 0730, the
scout team observed a suspected enemy position just south of Hill 191. Using
.50-caliber machine guns, it probed the site. After receiving no counterfire it
moved closer to the position and discovered that it was a decoy pOsitiOn. Once
clear of the obstacle, Task Force Grizzly moved to Hill 191 without further
incident.
   Occupation of the site proved anticlimactic. By mid-morning it was clear that
the majority of the Iraqis between the two obstacle belts had either already
withdrawn or were surrendering. Colonel Fulks believed that a counterattack
seemed increasingly unlikely with each passing hour and he began concentrating
on Task Force Grizzly's follow-on assignment, securing the Al Jaber Airfield.
To the Marines of Task Force Grizzly, the lack of enemy activity came as a
relief following the physically exhausting all-night march to Hill 191.
   Task Force Grizzly continued active operations. A constant stream of Iraqi
prisoners entered Grizzly's lines. Colonel Fulks sent patrols into the surrounding
desert. They initiated several artillery missions. For example, at 0930, a patrol
from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, located a tower that it believed to be an
Iraqi retransmission site.  A barrage from the 3d Battalion,     12th Marines,
destroyed the tower. However, the enemy responded with sporadic mortar fire
which the artillery battalion countered. On the first volley by Marine artillery
the enemy mortar crews surrendered. Late in the afternoon another 3d Battalion
scout team spotted five stationary enemy vehicles with 15 dismounted soldiers
located in the open. They immediately called in artillery against this target.
   Compared with the anticipated intense enemy counterattacks that failed to
materialize, the first day of the ground offensive proved equally anticlimactic for
Task Force Taro. At 0325 the task force began moving through the first obstacle
belt. Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, took the lead. With each company
in column, the battalion marched north unfazed by sporadic and inaccurate
artillery fire.
   The task force encountered only scattered groups of the enemy, all of which
it engaged with long-distance artillery fire. At 0615 a forward observer from
Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, directed the howitzers of 1st Battalion,
12th Marines, against five EMPs. Fifteen minutes later, another observer called
in an artillery mission on two tanks and four BMPs. At 1205 a third fire mission