WITH THE 1ST MARiNE DIVISiON iN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM


credited to 2nd Pit, because the[y] surrendered to our t[an]ks in our sector.
POWs were blowing us kisses, waving American flags and ask[ing] for food and
water.
   Knowing from his monitoring of division headquarters' radio traffic that Task
Force Ripper needed to move forward quickly, Colonel Admire offered 14
trucks from the regimental truck platoon as well as the second company from
the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, for prisoner transportation and handling duty.
General Myatt welcomed the reinforcements, and at 1539 the trucks and infantry
company departed to the northwest. That accomplished, the Marines of Task
Force Taro settled in for the night.
   As the Marines of Task Forces Grizzly and Taro reflected on the day's
events, they felt a general sense of relief. Their part of the attack never found
any formidable Iraqi defense. They quickly eliminated the minimal resistance
encountered, and, important in the thinking of each participant, incurred few
casualties in the process. This pattern existed from the first moment of the
offensive and continued through the day. After months of preparing for the
worst, by the time the sun set on 24 February, some Marines began to feel that
the entire offensive might go as painlessly as it had thus far.
   Likewise, by the end of the day, Marines of Task Forces Ripper and Papa
Bear experienced a similar sense of relief. Their advances were similarly fast
and bloodless, and both task forces successfully reached their limits of advance.
It was darkness, they needed to consolidate their gains, and to prepare for the
following day's attack, and therefore they halted their drives.120
   On the evening of 23 February, General Myatt, Colonel Fulford, and Colonel
Hodory could only hope that the hints offered by developments on Task Force
Grizzly's front suggested the Iraqis were not enthusiastic about fighting. Later
that night, Task Force Taro and Task Force Grizzly reported by radio that the
area between the two obstacle belts was neither heavily nor resolutely defended.
That agreed with recent intelligence and nothing happened during the night to
alter the impression. By the time Task Force Ripper launched its attack, Marines
in the waiting assault vehicles felt they were going against a defense that already
seemed to be coming apart, at least along the first obstacle belt.
   At 0405 Task Force Ripper began the drive that would prove that one way
or the other. The attack began at 0001 with receipt of the code word, "Coors
(Task Force Ripper to depart its assembly area).121  Radios came to life, vehicle
engines started, and the task force began moving to its attack position. Colonel
Fulford put the two mechanized infantry battalions and the tank battalion in a
task force wedge fbrmation. Using night vision devices, the drive forward was
slow and deliberate--as would be expected for a night movement. Nevertheless,
at 0125, Task Force Ripper crossed Phase Line Black on schedule. Scouts saw
no sign of the enemy, though 30 minutes later Colonel Fulford received an aerial
surveillance report indicating the existence of an enemy battery, four tanks,  six
BMPs, and a suspected command post in front of the task force.
   While moving to its attack position, Task Force Ripper picked up with its
forward air control (FAC) teams, artillery observers, naval gunfire teams,
surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon, and its mine-clearing tanks.