WITH THE 1ST MARINE DrvlSION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            77


An occasional derelict automobile or sand-filled oil drums marked an uncertain
lane. The second minefield was also better laid out and more dangerous.
   The obstacle clearing detachments followed the same procedure used in
opening lanes through the first minefield. There was one difference in this
assault: the Iraqis chose to oppose the Marines' second breach. Colonel Fulford
began Task Force Ripper's assault with a barrage of smoke rounds to obscure
the area, followed by a series of variable time fuse (vT) fire missions against
enemy bunkers. Variable time fuse shells exploded above the ground and
saturated the trenches with fragments. Behind the smoke screen the obstacle
clearing detachments moved in and began work to clear four lanes at 1200.
Though a detachment clearing a lane for the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, lost its
engineer marking vehicle when it got stuck in a bomb crater, and the line
charges again had to be manually primed, within eight minutes the officer
commanding  the detachment       fired the green and white star  combination
signifying the clearing of the first lane.   By  1215, the combat engineers
succeeded in opening lanes 2, 3, and 4. The 3d Tank Battalion and the 1st
Battalion, 7th Marines, immediately went through and began the task force
assat~lt against the defending Iraqi positions.
   The situation developed into a confusion of surrendering Iraqi soldiers and
intermittent engagements against determined defenders. Major Drew Bennett,
operations officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, found the battalion engulfed by
`1hundreds upon hundreds of Iraqis sporting white flags . . . converging on the
breach sites, especially lane-3.......before it was entirely out of the minefield.
The senior officer with the forward element, Captain Baker, attempted to save
the situation by sending one platoon forward to secure the front and dismounting
an infantry and an engineer platoon to escort prisoners through the breach. The
number of surrendering soldiers increased and ultimately threatened to impede
the battalion's advance. Eventually, Lieutenant Colonel James Mattis decided
to dismount another infantry platoon and directed it to establish a temporary
holding area about 300 meters south of the breach. It held the prisoners there
until Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (the task force reserve), arrived to
take over this duty.
   The effort proved futile. Within minutes the situation worsened. The loss of
one lane forced the diversion of traffic to the single open lane, 3. Then, as the
mechanized columns converged, the absence of the division breach control party,
which had not yet been able to get to the second obstacle belt, compounded an
already difficult situation. Because there was no one there controlling traffic the
lane became a jumble of prisoners with their Marine guards going in one
direction colliding with the press of supply vehicles and the LAVs of Task Force
Shepherd attempting to go in the opposite direction.  Inevitably, the lane got
congested and movement completely halted. It was precisely the type of delay
that General Myatt wanted to avoid. However, it was also precisely this type of
local situation that General Myatt wanted his commanders to recognize and use
their own initiative to correct. The senior officer present, Lieutenant Colonel
Mattis, saw what occurred and took immediate steps to clear the lane. The
obvious problem centered on the enemy prisoners and the scattered vehicles