WITH THE 1ST MARINE DWIS!ON IN DESERT SlItELD AND DESERT STORM            83


command post to established a screen along the "15" east-west grid line on their
maps. As the task force moved towards its assigned position, it skirted the
western boundary of the Burqan Oil field and became the first Marine unit to
encounter what Captain John F.   McElroy,  the task force historian,    later
characterized as the "surrealistic battlefield where visibility at 1500 was down
to 50 to 100 meters........caused by the hundreds of burning oil wells. Not
only was visibility poor, but progress was also slowed by the multitude of
surrendering Iraqi soldiers. "Literally thousands of Iraqis emerged, at times,
begging for food," wrote Captain McElroy. Company C also destroyed four T-
62s and captured an enemy truck carrying a group of officers. Company D,
which had just returned to Task Force Shepherd, destroyed an additional two T-
62s near the power line. Two and a half hours later Company D reported a
successful fight against 5 more T-62s. Company A found 40 dismounted
infantry in a bunker. The task force kept moving until it reached the "15" east-
west grid line where Lieutenant Colonel Myers established a screen that went
as far east as the western edge of the Al Burqan Oilfield.1~
   The rapid collapse of Jaber Airfield startled General Myatt. Marine staff
estimates expected the airfield to be a difficult objective and General Boomer
made it the focus of the first day's attack. As the fighting evolved on 24
February, the Iraqi 14th Thfantry Regiment, 56th Mechanized hfantry Brigade,
surrendered en masse. The artillery grouping north of the airfield also proved
ineffectual. Instead of a difficult and costly battle, the 1st Marine Division
readily breached the second obstacle belt. The situation proved so promising that
General Myatt decided to move the forward command post through the second
obstacle belt to a location within the division bridgehead area. He wanted to be
well-placed for directing the next day's attack.
   As General Myatt moved north he received disturbing news from Colonel
Fulford. Prisoners captured by Task Force Ripper indicated that a counter-
attack was going to come from "out of the flames." A captured map confirmed
prisoner accounts. However,  it was not conclusive and burning weliheads
existed along the division's entire front. Myatt sensed that the phrase meant the
attack would come from the Al Burqan Oilfield. In his analysis he saw the
oilfield as the only area capable of hiding a large enemy force. If correct, the
attack threatened to hit Task Force Papa Bear on the division's right flank.
   Up to that point, Task Force Papa Bear had played a limited role as the
division reserve in support of Task Force Ripper's main attack. The task force
was to begin moving to its attack position at 0200, but Colonel Hodory set it
creeping forward in advance of the scheduled hour. At 0533 Task Force Papa
Bear crossed Phase Line Black and entered Kuwait in column formation led by
3d Battalion, 9th Marines, followed by the engineer task force (1st Combat
Engineer Battalion Detachment), 1st Tank Battalion, and  1st Battalion,   1st
Marines. By 0745 the task force reached its attack position.'41
   Task Force Papa Bear remained at its attack position until 0905 when the
3d Battalion, 9th Marines, began breaching the first obstacle belt to the east of
Task Force Ripper's lanes. The obstacle belt consisted of a barbed wire fence
marking its f~~rward edge, an anti-personnel and antitank minefield (120 meters