88                                 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


Force X-Ray and to protect the division's right flank unt~l Colonel Howard got
all five artillery battalions repositioned in the morning. Once X-Ray and the
artillery were in place, General Myatt gave Colonel Hodory an "on order"
mission to continue attacking northeast.
    As Colonel Hodory planned his new mission General Myatt reassessed the
tactical situation. For the most part the offensive had gone very much as
planned. The division had finished the day on planned objectives. Four artillery
battalions were already in position to support the continuing attack and Colonel
Howard planned to move the last battalion, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, early
the next morning. During 0-Day, the artillery fired 1,346 rounds, mostly rocket
assisted projectiles (RAP), in support of the task forces, yet ammunition supplies
were still plentiful.
    The one aspect of the operation which failed to happen was the helicopter
insertion of Task Force X-Ray. To the infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 3d
Marines, the lack of helicopters, the diverse squadron origin of those provided,
the lack of pilot rehearsal, and the seeming ad hoc operation that emerged left
the impression that the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had reached the limit of its
resources. The helicopter shortage reduced the task force by almost two-thirds
of its strength. Unfamiliarity of pilots and crews with Task Force X-Ray and
its equipment, as well as a shortage of pilots qualified in night formation flying
limited the maneuverability of the helicopterborne force. General Myatt lost the
flexibility he required should the ground offensive not go as planned.
    For Task Force X-Ray the first day went completely awry. The Iraqi defense
of the second belt proved strong enough to delay the breach. General Myatt
needed the breachhead to be large enough to accommodate the landing of Task
Force X-Ray and it took the mechanized task forces most of the afternoon to
secure the necessary area, which left them with only 40 minutes to establish a
landing zone  (LZ).1~ Consequently, instead of a daylight insertion, the
helicopters arrived over the second breachhead at 1800 in darkness. Pilots saw
a battlefield active with burning wells, burning enemy tanks, machine gun and
antiaircraft fire, and Marine vehicles that milled about without any apparent
sense of         direction.141 They also saw more than one landing zone. Earlier, an
artillery mission hit the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and killed twO Iraqi prisoners
and wounded one Marine, one Navy corpsman, and 23 eneiny prisoners of war.
Consequently, a flight of medevac helicopters was expected at any moment thus
causing the marking of a second landing zone.
    Compounding the problems facing Task Force X-Ray was the gradual
disorientation experienced by the pilots as their formation maneuvered to avoid
the clouds of smoke and overcast conditions encountered near the second breach.
The flight leader attempted to get assistance from division headquarters, but he
only had the frequency to the division tactical net. He found it overwhelmed
with radio traffic from the battalions fighting to secure the breachhead. When
he finally established communications with General Myatt, they decided that the
confused situation on the ground and in the air, and the threat of heat-seeking
missiles, courted disaster the longer the flight continued. Myatt believed the
mechanized task forces had the situation well enough in hand that he ordered