WrrH THE 1ST MARINE DWlSION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            97


weather  conditions suddenly deteriorated. The  little sunlight that existed
disappeared behind a completely overcast sky. Also, the wind shifted and
brought with it smoke from the burning ojifields, thereby further reducing
visibility.1~ Colonel Fulks remained determined to take Al Jaber that day--
General Boomer needed the airfield as a forward helicopter base. Fuiks extended
the 3d Battalion to cover 2d Battalion's gap and he reworked his plans for a
single battalion assault.
   With one company from the 2d Battalion placed in reserve, the 3d Battalion
began Grizzly's attack at 1602. Fulks wanted a methodical attack beginning
with cuts in the perimeter fence, followed by artillery and mortar preparation,
concluding with the assault and building clearing operations.   The enemy
remained  passive and made  no  attempt    to disrupt 3d Battalion's  initial
movement.  For some Iraqis, the sight of Marines advancing towards the
perimeter fence was enough. Even before lead elements reached the fence, 18
Iraqi soldiers emerged from the outer defenses and surrendered. Though they
claimed the airfield was abandoned, Colonel Fulks could not risk an ambush and
continued the methodical attack. At 1645, 3d Battalion's combat engineers and
scouts planted explosives that blew holes in the airport perimeter fence. An
engineer was wounded by one of the explosions and had to be evacuated.
   At 1722, preparation fires began striking Al Jaber. Mortar fire rained in on
the airfield hitting its defenses with 86 rounds of high explosive rounds.
Artillery fire fell on suspected command and control positions. The Iraqi 449th
Artillery Brigade, III Corps, countered with an unusually accurate response by
what remained of its artillery north of Al Jaber. Company I bore the brunt of
an Iraqi rocket salvo but suffered no casualties. On the other hand, Company
K lost 10 Marines wounded and one killed. Another volley fell on the forward
deployed Battery G, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, which wounded two Marines.
For the next several hours, the Iraqis kept up sporadic fire against Marine
artillery positions, no further rounds fell on Task Force Grizzly, and there were
no additional casualties.
   The experience justified concerns prior to G-Day about the threat posed by
Iraqi artillery concentrations. Before Grizzly's assault on Al Jaber progressed
past the perimeter fence enemy artillery had already made it the costliest ground
operation of the offensive. Colonel Fulks reevaluated the situation. He faced a
force of unknown size, the task force appeared to be in a fire sack, smoke and
darkness reduced visibility, and several gas alarms delayed efforts to evacuate
wounded and continue the assault. Yet, Colonel Fulks decided to press on and,
at 1746 hours Company K managed to slip through the holes in the perimeter
fence and establish a foothold in the airfield's outer defenses.
   Their attack met no resistance, which convinced Fulks to press forward to
take the airfield that evening. Close observation of Al Jaber by Marines using
thermal sights and night vision devices supported his decision. They saw few,
if any, defenders. Assisted by 8lmm illumination rounds the 3d Battalion's
assault continued. For the next four hours, the battalion gradually crept forward
and captured 32 Iraqi soldiers. Progress became increasingly more difficult
when blowing oil smoke frequently reduced visibility to a few yards. By 2100,