WITH THE 1ST MARINE DIVISJON IN DESERT SllIELD AND DESERT STORM            103


night operations. However, by the end of the first day's operations, General
Myatt discovered that the blowing smoke obscured the battlefield during the day
and frequently rendered night vision devices inoperable. The inability to see in
the dark forced Myatt to abandon the idea of large-scale night operations. Also,
extensive smoke and cloud cover canceled out the use of fighter-attack aircraft
and made it difficult even for AH- 1W Cobras to operate. On the third day of the
ground attack, when the division moved into the heart of the Al Burqan Oilfield,
the task forces found themselves frequently plunged into virtual darkness when
wind shifts suddenly blanketed them under smoke too thick for sunlight to
penetrate. Gunnery Sergeant Cochran noted at the time that: "It was like being
in a black hole.
                     G Plus 2, 26 Februa,y 1991

   The dawn  of G   Plus 2  was  not characterized by the        persistent fog
encountered the morning before,  and units quickly moved to their attack
positions for the assault. Reports were coming into division headquarters that
the Iraqi III Corps had received orders to withdraw. General Boomer did not
want the III Corps to get away and, as part of I MEF's two-division attack,
General Myatt directed Colonel Fulford to begin moving at 0654. Boomer
wanted both divisions to attack on line and Fulford's first task was to move his
task force north 10 kilometers to link up with the 8th Marines and the 2d Light
Armored Infantry Battalion of the 2d Marine Division on his left flank.
   The battleground Task Force Ripper traversed was littered with enemy tanks
and vehicles. Some showed obvious signs of destruction from air bombardment;
other vehicles appeared intact but abandoned. However, some crews remained
with their vehicles and waited in ambush. As Task Forces Ripper and Papa
Bear advanced, each  tank unit commander developed different policies for
dealing with this threat. In Task Force Papa Bear, 1st Tank Battalion shot at
everything. In Task Force Ripper, 3d Tank Battalion tested Iraqi vehicles with
long-range machine gun fire to see if the enemy responded. If it did, a tank
round or TOW missile followed and dispatched the Iraqi vehicle. The infantry
battalions led with their scout detachments, which used TOW thermal sights to
determine whether the enemy vehicle gave a "hot" or a "cold" signature. If the
Iraqi vehicle or tank had its systems turned on and registered "hot" as a result,
they engaged it. The frequent firefights interrupted the rapid advance with
numerous stops and starts.
   The drive to Kuwait City took place in two phases. In the first part, General
Myatt set the limit of advance for Task Force Ripper at the "30" east-west grid
line (marked by a line of high tension wires), 10 miles south of the Kuwait
International Airport. Myatt ordered Colonel Fulford to hold Ripper there while
the rest of the division came into position for the final push.
   At dawn, Task Force Ripper deployed into its standard wedge formation
and began the drive with 3d Tank Battalion in the lead. Encountering only
scattered resistance, which the task force easily brushed aside, Ripper reached
the designated limit of advance at 1130 and halted. Though enemy forces seldom