WITH THE I MARINE EXPEDrrIONARY FORCE iN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM        39

during testing.  After taking steps to improve fuse reliability, Marine combat
engineers retained them for use in the assault. However, the engineers were not
able to adequately test the chain flail bulldozers which they nicknamed "Ninja
Dozers."   Every Marine understood the inherent dangers of the obstacle belts.
While they believed they could handle mines, barbed wire, and even fiery
trenches, the time required to do so meant that the assaulting forces would be
vulnerable to the enemy's many indirect fire weapons.27
   Force ratios were another worry.  Conventional planning normally required
at least a 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders to assure success.  In a preliminary
I MEF analysis made on 23 December, MarCent and NavCent amphibious
forces would not attain parity with the Iraqis except in anti-tank weapons.  The
relative strengths of MarCent forces, including brigades afloat, compared to
estimated Iraqi forces in both southeastern Kuwait and in the MarCent sector
were:


   Item          MarCent         SE Kuwait          MarCent Area
 Personnel         83,000        202,355 (1: 2.4)      98,755 (1:1.2)
 Tanks               389           1,596 (1: 4.1)       1,137(1: 2.9)
 Artillery           264           1,206 (1: 4.6)        648 (1: 2.5)
 APC                 969           1,309 (1:1.4)         922 (1:1.1)
 Antitank            725            324 (2.2:1)          108 (6.?: 1)


For I MEF's assault to succeed,    it was imperative that the force achieve
overwhelming ratios locally at the breach points.   At the same time, the force
had  to   prevent  Iraqi reinforcements  from  closing.   One       key  to these
requirements was the use of deception to prevent the Iraqi commanders from
forming an accurate picture of the situation on the battlefield.~

                   Deception and Psychological Waffare'

   Deception planning began in mid-December when the force received a draft
of the CentCom deception plan.   General Schwarzkopf wanted to deceive Iraqi
forces as to his intentions and the actual location and identities of his units and
their sectors. Colonel Charles M. Lohman, the force operations officer, formed
a planning cell under Lieutenant Colonel Franklin D.      Lane that included
representatives  of the principal  staff, major   subordinate      commands,  the
psychological operations suppofl element, the electronic warfare section, and
the 1st Radio Battalion.  The cell based its planning on several assumptions:
that real assets would be used, that the enemy would be able to interpret the
deception, that the main deception effort would have to occur prior to the first
stage of the ground campaign, that there would be no more than a 24-hour
advance   notice  of that stage, and that    human   resources      and electronic
intelligence were the main and secondary enemy collection capability.       By 23
December, the cell had developed three deception courses of action:      an attack
along the Iraqi III and IV Corps boundary near Al Manaqish to seize objectives