IIR 6 284 0008 94/DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

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IIR 6 284 0008 94/DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS 

Filename:68240008.94
CDSN = LGX120   MCN = 93287/21893   TOR = 932871327 
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7625 2871325-    --RUEALGX. 
ZNY 
P 141325Z OCT 93 
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC 
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC 
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC 
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC 
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC 
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN-CMO// 
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22// 
[   (b)(2)   ]
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD 
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN// 
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP 
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2// 
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
RUEALGX/SAFE 
P 140950Z OCT 93 
FM [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY 
INFO RUEOAYB/FSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//AIFICA// 
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:SEE// 
RUEKJCS/JOINTSTAFF WASHDC//J-5/PMA// 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EEY/EUR-PM// 
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE 
BT 

 
 
SERIAL:  (U) IIR 6 824 0008 94 
 
 
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ 
COUNTRY:  (U) CZECH REPUBLIC (EZ). 
 
SUBJ:  IIR 6 284 0008 94/DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS 
BY CZECHOSLOVAK UNIT DURING DESERT STORM, PART III (U) 
 
WARNING:  (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT 
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  [   (b)(2)   ]
 
/------------------------------------------------------ 
-- 
                 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
/------------------------------------------------------ 
-- 
 
DOI:  (U) 910101-910830 
 
REQS:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
 
SOURCE:  A- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

         B- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

         C- [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

SUMMARY:  (U) PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON 
CHEMICAL AGENTS DETECTED DURING DESERT STORM IN THE 
JOINT FORCES COMMAND -- NORTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS 
 
TEXT:  1.  THIS REPORT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL AND 
CLARIFYING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DETECTION OF 
CHEMICAL AGENTS BY THE CZECHOSLOVAKS DURING DESERT 
STORM.  THIS INCLUDES THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
CZECHOSLOVAK NBC DETACHMENTS, DETECTION AND 
IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE AREA AROUND 
KING KAHLID MILITARY CITY (KKMC), AND REPORTING OF THIS 
DATA THROUGH CHANNELS. 
 
2.  OPERATIONS OF CZECH DETACHMENTS.  THE 
CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES DEPLOYED TO SAUDI ARABIA WERE TASK 
ORGANIZED INTO THREE DETACHMENTS, TWO OF WHICH WERE 
SUPPOSED TO SUPPORT ROYAL SAUDI FORCES, AND THE THIRD 
WHICH WAS TO BE HELD IN RESERVE AND SUPPORT 
CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES.  DURING ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT, ALL 
THREE DETACHMENTS WERE IN FACT SUBORDINATED TO THE 
JOINT FORCES COMMAND NORTH COMMANDED BY SAUDI GENERAL 
((SULIMAN)).  EACH DETACHMENT [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]


          AND WAS FULLY EQUIPPED TO INDEPENDENTLY 
IDENTIFY AND DECONTAMINATE CHEMICAL AGENTS.  THEY 
UTILIZED [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]

3.  THESE THREE NBC DETACHMENTS WERE TO 
SUBORDINATED TO THE 20TH SAUDI BRIGADE AND ITS BASE 
CAMP LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 10 KM NORTH EAST OF HAFAR AL 
BATIN (2827 N 04558E), THE 4TH SAUDI ARMORED BRIGADE, 
AND TO THE HEADQUARTERS KKMC. 
 
4.  ON 19 JANUARY 1991, ALL THREE CZECHOSLOVAK 
DETACHMENTS INDEPENDENTLY DETECTED A G SERIES NERVE 
AGENT WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES OF EACH OTHER. 
AT THAT TIME, THE UNITS WERE BETWEEN 20 TO 50 KM 
DISTANT FROM EACH OTHER.  AT LEAST ONE OF THESE UNITS, 
AT THE TIME OF DETECTION, WAS CONVOYING TO A NEW 
LOCATION, IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THEIR ASSIGNED MAJOR 
COMMAND. 
 
5.  DETECTION WAS MADE INDEPENDENTLY AT EACH OF THE 
THREE DETACHMENTS USING TWO SEPARATE PROCEDURES; ONE 
WHICH USED WET CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AND ANOTHER WHICH USED 
BIOCHEMICAL ASSAY.  IN BOTH CASES, THE MEDIUM WAS AIR 
SAMPLING OF THE IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT.  AFTER THE 
INITIAL DETECTION, NO SUBSEQUENT TESTS IN TIME DETECTED 
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ANY CHEMICAL AGENT.  RETAINED 
SAMPLES FROM AT LEAST ONE DETACHMENT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY 
TESTED AT THE FIELD LABORATORY [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
AND WAS CONFIRMED TO CONTAIN A G-SERIES NERVE AGENT.  THE 
RESULTS OF THIS COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS WERE FORWARDED 
IN A SITREP TO THE HQTRS KKMC, UNDER SAUDI GENERAL 
SALIMAN, AND PASSED TO SOUTHERN HQTRS (RIYADH), AND 
ALSO TO CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE   THERE WERE 
NO FOLLOW UP ACTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS TO OUTLINE THE 
CONTAMINATION. 

6.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] NO MILITARY EMPLOYMENTS 
OR ACTIONS, TO INCLUDE SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS, ARTILLERY, SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS, OR BOMBING, DURING THE TIME THE DETECTIONS WERE MADE. 
 THE [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
DETECTION WAS THE RESULT OF CHEMICAL AGENTS RELEASED 
BEHIND THE IRAQI LINES AS A RESULT OF COALITION 
BOMBING. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] THE WEATHER CONDITIONS 
DURING THIS EVENT INCLUDED A STRONG INVERSION, AND NO 
PRECIPITATION.  ([   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] THE NEAREST BOMBING 
OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED CW RELATED BUNKERS WAS OVER 100 NM 
FROM THIS REGION.) 
 
7.  EVEN THOUGH THE CONCENTRATION OF THE DETECTED G 
AGENT WAS SO LOW THAT IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A RISK, AND 
WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY CALL FOR DONNING PROTECTIVE 
GEAR, PROTECTIVE GEAR WAS IN FACT DONNED DUE TO THE 
CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT OF CW USE BY THE IRAQIS. 
 
8. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]                 NO
CHEMICAL AGENTS OR MUNITIONS HAD BEEN EMPLOYED DURING 
THIS TIMEFRAME.  FURTHER, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
            NO IRAQI, OR OTHER NATIONAL MANUFACTURE OF 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS FOUND IN THE NORTHERN AREA OF 
OPERATIONS WHERE THE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR CHEMICAL DEFENSE. 
 
9.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] THE DETECTION OF ANOTHER 
CHEMICAL AGENT, AFTER [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] UNIT WAS 
ORDERED BY GEN SALIMAN TO INVESTIGATE A PUDDLE IN THE DESERT, 
10-KM 
NORTH WEST OF KKMC, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED 
AS SULFUR MUSTARD.  THE RESULTS OF THIS FINDING WERE 
REPORTED IN A SITREP TO THE SAUDIS AND THROUGH ARAB 
CHANNELS TO RIYADH.  THIS PUDDLE WAS FOUND WHERE IT WAS 
IDENTIFIED BY THE SAUDI MILITARY, AND THERE WAS NO 
INDICATION THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF ANY MUNITIONS, TO 
INCLUDE AN ERRANT SCUD MISSILE, ARTILLERY, OR OTHER 
WEAPON TYPE.  THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR, WITH NO 
PRECIPITATION IN THE AREA FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS, AND 
THERE WAS NO OBSERVED TANK OR VEHICLE TRACKS NEAR THE 
PUDDLE.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
                      THERE WAS NO FURTHER FOLLOW UP BY 
ANY HEADQUARTERS. 
 
10. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] IN THE ABSENCE OF 
NBC WARFARE IN THE GULF, THE THREAT POSED BY IRAQ 
DURING ALL OPERATIONS--ESPECIALLY IN PROVIDING NBC 
DEFENSIVE SUPPORT TO KKMC, REQUIRED THAT AFTER EACH 
SCUD MISSILE ATTACK, A COMPLETE ANALYSIS WAS DONE.  ALL 
THESE RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE.  CZECHOSLOVAK DETACHMENTS 
INVESTIGATED MANY SCUD, AS WELL AS ARTILLERY IMPACT 
AREAS DURING THE WAR, AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE IN ANY 
INVESTIGATED CRATER OF RESIDUAL CHEMICAL AGENTS, OR 
DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS.  THIS 
INFORMATION WAS SHARED WITH THE SAUDI CHAIN OF COMMAND. 
 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]


 
//IPSP:  (U) PG 1610//. 
//COMSOBJ:  (U) 143; 113//. 
PROJ:  (U). 
COLL:  (U) AB. 
INSTR:  (U) US NO. 
PREP:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
ACQ:  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
DISSEM:  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
WARNING:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]