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	to Clifton [Danny] who came in and set up the A-10
	flying operation at the outset.

 
S:	To some future commander that is facing the same situation
	that you are facing now, what would you emphasize, or
	reemphasize, for him or her to take account of or to set up
	an FOL like this?


R:	The greatest challenges at KKMC really have not been, from a
	Deputy Commander for Operations perspective, in the routine
	A-10, F-16, or MAC flying operation, surprisingly enough.
	The greatest trials came in the first week of the war
	because of our geographical location and because of the .
	weather on days 3 through 6 when the weather was
	significantly degraded and on days 3 and 4 here when we
	consistently had ceilings of less than 200 feet and
	visibility of less than 1/2 mile. We were the closest major
	installation to targets across the Iraqi border and about
	the only one with good IFR [Instrument Flight Rules]
	recovery systems: PAR [Precision Approach Radar], ILS
	[Instrument Landing System], etc.

	On the morning of the 19th of January at approximately 5:36
	local, an F-4G crashed on the airfield after making three
	approaches in close to zero-zero weather; ran out of gas,
	and the pilot and WSO [Weapons Systems Officer] ejected just
	after aircraft flameout. The aircraft landed approximately
	200 yards to the east of the civilian air terminal.

	We were extremely lucky that the aircraft did not impact in
	a quarter-of-a-million-gallons bladder complex in the
	weapons storage area or in the hospital complex at the north
	end of the field. That accident--that documentation can be
	found somewhere else, but this operation was just starting
	to mature at that time. RAPCON [Radar Approach Control] had

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