Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

M: We didn't have particular rapid runway repair capability
here. We had plenty of matting. We did not have some of
the tie-down systems that were required. We were always
short on heavy equipment. We had a Red Horse unit deployed
here. The word was, they were always getting ready to
leave.   We  didn't know what their situation was. They were
sent here actually to set up the A-l0 parking areas, and
they did some birming for us. They helped us build the WSA
[Weapons Storage Area]. I assume, and I was told, that they
would do rapid runway repair for us. I'm sure they would
have helped out with that had we needed it.

We had, like I said, plenty of AM-2 matting, but we didn't
have the tie-down system. It is my feeling, only because we
are located at KKMC, that we would have been able to fill
the crater, cover it, and even asphalt it in minimum time,
that being within a 24-hour period; and that being because
the asphalt plant is located 2 or 3 miles away from us.
There is plenty of Saudi heavy equipment located up at the
city, which is only about 5 miles away. We would have had
the assets to do all that with, but we never had a chance to
practice; never had the right equipment or materials.

S: What about the base recovery after attack, the BRAT system?

M: Well, BRAT is comprised of many things. Had we gone into an
        [b)(1)sec3.4 (b)(5)]                      I think we would have fared
well. The training and experience we have gained from all
the exercises in Europe, PACAF, and back in TAC have
directly yielded benefits in the way we handle the post-
attack scenarios. We had real chickens that were a primary
way of detecting chemicals. We had a very good, very
integrated NBC program and chemical detection program. We
had [b)(1)sec3.4(b)(4)]

		
                                                                           19

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search