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There were some command and control problems related to
getting the commander in the loop to make decisions to go
[(b)(l)sec3.4(b)(5)] Sometimes decisions had to be
made locally without direct commander input because there
are so many different ways of interpreting the information,
and sometimes people would feel the need to make very rapid
decisions. Sometimes this proved prudent; sometimes it
proved futile, so it was a constant learning curve. We were
learning how to respond to the various attacks.

Without the Red Horse capability or without the heavy
equipment capability by our own civil engineers, we were
always at a loss to know how we would put the airfield back
into operation, but we had lots of plans to do that. We had
lots of work-arounds. We planned to use the parallel
taxiway as a runway, had we needed to do that. I think BRAT
would have been effective. I never felt comfortable with
it, but then again, it was never exercised. We were lucky.
However, all the training that we are doing back home really
paid off, and I will make an assumption that if we continue
training the way we have been, the BRAT program will
continue to operate.

S: Looking back on your experiences here, what were the
greatest lessons learned?

M: Lessons learned: First of all, the training paid off. I
don't see a great need to rewrite the books. Continue to do
general training that applies to any airfield anywhere and
under worst case threat scenario. If we do that, we have
trained adequately. Communication in the field was a
difficult thing. That has been known for a long time. The
simpler the communications system, the better. Having
everybody on the same type radio and all the radios
programmed the same way is a prudent thing to do. It causes

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