TASK FORCE III DESERT SHIELD/STORM

File: aaacf_09.txt
Page: 09
Total Pages: 273
technicians felt inadequate in performing the necessary environmental 
assessments. 
 
E M P L O Y M E N T 
 
The early deploying units found heavy patient loads -- up to 80 
patients a day at King Fahd. This demand typically decreased and leveled 
after the first month or two. Reported patient visit workload is contained in Appendix 
A. The perception was that even after the ATH's arrived, ATC's saw 2 to 3 times 
more sick call patients because of better accessibility. Traveler's diarrhea was 
common but self limited. Diarrheas refractory to conservative therapy usually 
responded to Cipro. Heat stress visits were minimal in units with good pre-
deployment briefs. Several SME's treated significant numbers of heat casualties 
from other units such as security police or collocated Army units. 
	Some units deployed with inadequate amounts of personal hygiene 
supplies. 
	MRE's were the only source of food at some locations while others had host 
nation food services in place. Line commanders were reluctant to close down 
marginal host nation food services because of the adverse impact on morale. A 
combination of reluctance to be inspected on the part of the Saudi's, inability to 
enforce recommendations, low level of experience in food inspection among the 
SME's, and early demands for clinical vs. preventive medical services resulted in 
several food-borne outbreaks of gastroenteritis. In all, 16 separate outbreaks at 10 
different locations were identified involving 2,500 cases. Of these, 4 occurred in 
the month of August at 4 separate locations. Appendix B contains a summary 
of these outbreaks extracted from information presented by Col. Butts to the After-
Action Conference. The SME's concurred with the Environmental Health after-
action assessment that an organic food service could have prevented nearly all of 
these outbreaks.  Additionally, SME's wanted more environmental/sanitation 
experience in the SME package. First preference was to substitute an IDMT for a 
901X0, second to substitute a military public health technician, third to leave the 
SME as is and construct an environmental UTC with 907X0, 908X0, and a suitable 
equipment package that may be deployed on request. 
	One location reported that co-located Canadian forces had a "model 
installation". Three hot meals a day were provided by their own food service. 
Their medical staff was twice that of the SME and supported fewer personnel. 
Their supply pipeline was responsive within 48 hours. Their mobile 
decontamination system was simpler and more flexible than the American 
equivalent. 
	Many flight surgeons, especially the fighter SME's, had difficulty meeting 
flying hour requirements. All currency requirements in AFR 60-1 were 
eventually waived by HQ USAF/SGPA, but the requirement for 4 hours per month
to qualify for flight pay is set by Congress. CENTAF(rear)/SGPA coordinated with 
HQ MAC/SGPA to allow all flight surgeons in theater to log time on 
MAC aircraft. CENTAF/CC also authorized the combat-related time extension 
specified in DOD regulations. Physiologic training and flight physical currency 
was also waived by HQ USAF/SGPA. 
	At some locations, medical intelligence became more difficult to get with 
time. 
	A few SME's relocated within theater. One relocated three times. This 
underscored the need for the logistics and command and control aspects of the 
ATC's to remain substantially independent of the ATH.