TASK FORCE III DESERT SHIELD/STORM

File: aaacf_10.txt
Page: 10
Total Pages: 273
S U P P L Y

	Many ATC's arrived in several shipments over the course of 7 to 14 days. 
The condition of the ATC's on arrival was mostly good. Exceptions were related to 
heat in theater or poor maintenance while in WRM storage. There were reports 
of deteriorated plastic tubing, tents, and melted gelatin capsules. Not all ATC's 
were deployed with the May 1990 table of allowances resulting in a variety of 
functional deficiencies, most notably an outdated formulary. Several suggestions 
for changes to the ATC Table of Allowances (TA) were submitted; however, most 
had already been accomplished by the May 1990, TA revision or could easily be 
accommodated within the 250-pound option. Some proposed that laptop 
computers be added. Some SME's who received their ATC early had supplies 
confiscated by the ATM's whose personnel and equipment packages did not 
always arrive together.
	Resupply was a critical and persistent problem for nearly all units. Local 
purchase was used as the most rapid means of acquiring needed supplies but was 
also costly. The most reliable method of supply was to call the home base and 
have medical items sent with other line supplies being shipped. Inability of the 
SME's to order supplies directly impeded the resupply process. In cases where 
ATC's were not collocated with their supporting ATH, delays were experienced in 
obtaining ordered supplies. Intratheater airlift may have been adequate from 
Riyadh to any local base, but was often scarce between a given ATH location and 
that of the supported ATC. Some ATM's were reluctant to release their supplies to
ATC's. In at least one case, supplies ordered by one ATC through their 
designated supporting ATH were given to a different ATC necessitating 
reordering and further delays. At about the midpoint in Operation Desert Shield, 
units were advised that they should not request supplies from home base. Those 
who did not comply with this policy had fewer supply problems. One SME 
received the formal ATC resupply package and found it to be quite adequate.
	Difficulty in obtaining spectacles, contact lenses and associated solutions 
was almost universal. Patients' prescriptions were not always on record. Some 
U.S. Army optometry units were not familiar with aircrew frames. The 
environment caused accelerated degradation of lenses. The new-issue gas masks 
required different insert lenses. These factors overwhelmed an Army system 
planned to provide for all theater vision care needs. In addition, the Army 
MEDSOM did not stock the contact lenses and associated supplies which are 
used in the Air Force Contact Lens Program. The large list of acceptable lenses and 
solutions in use by Air Force aviators further complicated the problem. Except for 
the supply problem, contact lenses worked well for those who chose to continue 
their use. There were no reports received of an Air Force aviator who required 
ophthalmologic consultation in theater for a contact lens related problem.
	Bargaining, borrowing, trading, confiscating, and stealing were various 
methods used by units to procure needed supplies. Security and accountability of 
controlled drugs was a problem in a few locations. One ATC was robbed and the 
SME assaulted.
	SME's made early efforts to assess host nation medical support. When 
discussions were conducted in a polite, respectful manner, face-to-face with the 
responsible authorities, good host nation support resulted. In one location, labor 
relations problems caused host nation medical manpower to evaporate just prior 
to the start of Operation Desert Storm. Generally, SME's desired more rapid

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