Mobilization

File: aaabf_11.txt
Page: 11
Total Pages: 51

prescription and baseline laboratory data. Occasionally a call to home base was required to clarify some question, but this presented no
problems.
Many individuals were deployed on prescription medications for which refills were unavailable on either the ATC or ATH TA. Women's
health issues were poorly addressed in planning deployment supply packages. Birth control
pills should be added to the ATC Table of Allowances (TA).
There was no system to return patients to their bases after referral care.
The Navy ships Mercy and Comfort provided excellent specialty services, but the ships' movements were not predictable and once the vessel
was out of port, it was impossible to return a patient to his unit. Army helicopters were unable to pick
up patients from the hospital ships. Although Wing interest persisted, it was
impossible to keep track of a patient once he left a base for care. There was a low
level of confidence in the aeromedical evacuation system, and some patients were
sent home by regular airlift in lieu of aerevac when deemed safe to do so. Joint
Service cooperation was variable. Cases were related in which Air Force ATM's
refused care to Army patients. Doctor to doctor cooperation was more effective
than system to system.
There was almost universal need for better access to dental care. Deployed
SME's disagreed on whether the majority of the demand was a result of poor pre-
deployment enforcement of dental standards or due to acute problems. The
dentists reported their workload consisted of large numbers of acute problems but
also that the demand for care of preexisting problems was high among ARC
personnel. Dental services were also provided to Allies.
SME's felt they had no background to deal with dental problems.
Squadrons deployed to Desert Shield with much higher numbers of individuals than predicted by exercise experience and planned
for in the ATC Concept of Operations. Deployed bases continued to grow throughout Desert Shield far beyond original estimates. ATC s
designed to support 300 people for 30 days were supporting up to 1200 alone. Routine sick call medications were rapidly depleted. Only 4
of 17 flying wings had ATM's in place by the end of August. For supporting bases such as Moron, Cairo West, and Diego Garcia, the ever-
expanding role was not matched by reevaluation of medical needs. Most SME's felt the four-man ATC manpower UIC would be adequate to
support 800 deployed personnel at the visit rate seen during Desert Shield. Supplies should be increased to match that number.
There was one case of pain-only decompression sickness reported. An A-10 had rapid decompression at 25,000 feet. Symptoms
resolved at ground and hyperbaric therapy was not required.
One AWACS mission was terminated early for an in-flight attack of renal colic with subsequent lithotripsy of a stone.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Response of line commanders to SME input was variable and probably depended heavily on the degree of rapport and credibility
established before deployment
Command and control of SME's was frequently misunderstood by the medical command structure. Of the 18 individuals who
commanded a TAC ATH, only 7 were experienced night surgeons. Several SME's were required to perform MOD duties at the ATH. In other
cases, this request was refused by squadron or wing commanders. Other initiatives attempted to locate ATC operations within the ATH
impairing aircrew accessibility to their Flight surgeon. Conflicts also