Mobilization

File: aaabf_12.txt
Page: 12
Total Pages: 51

arose with regard to mass casualty planning and sick call scheduling. The SME's believed strongly that the 9356 slot on the ATH
should always be filled by an experienced flight surgeon. Ideally, this position would also be the commander, but in cases where
an individual s rank and experience do not make him/her the best candidate for ATH commander, he/she should function as an
executive advisor to the ATH/SG for aeromedical and professional affairs.
The ATC ConOps made no clear provision for integration of multiple SME's at a single location resulting in poor
coordination at some bases. In the Riyedh area, 5 separate 1041 logs existed and there was no crossfeed among the clinic sites.
Lack of credible senior flight surgeon experience at all locations and at the Headquarters impaired coordination of operations and
problem solving. Chart 4 contains a list of deployed Aerospace Medicine Specialists and their positions.
Some problems arose when ARC night surgeons who were senior in rank but junior in experience tried to assume a
supervisory role over active flight surgeons. Additionally, poor coordination between active and ARC elements resulted in
alternating manning overages and shortages at some locations. Morale was adversely impacted when ARC personnel arrived for
specified times then departed, leaving their active counterparts behind.
Reporting requirements were conflicting and overlapping. Three separate formats for disease reporting were in place.
Disease categories were not always defined e.g. whether sun burn should be reported as heat injury or dermatological problem.
Some categories were not clinically useful e.g. whether or not a gastroenteritis was treated with IV fluids. Some physicians were
more inclined to treat borderline cases with oral rehydration than IV's. Daily MEDRED-C reports in their current format provided
little useful information. ATC After-Action report format published in AFR 128-4 and TACR 400-10 bad inadequate aeromedical
emphasis. Not all SME's were aware of the revised format sent by message early in the deployment. Report of patients submitted
by ATM's did not always break out the ATC patient counts separately making it difficult to validate planning assumptions. Had it
been necessary to report casualty status in addition to all other patient categories, the process would have become even more
confusing.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

D-Day was 16 Jan 91. Cease fire was declared 28 Feb 91. In that time span, the U.S. Air Force flew 67,151 sorties.
Fatigue was the most significant and pervasive aircrew problem in Operation Desert Storm. CAP missions of 6-8 hours
were routine and often followed by an alert scramble of an additional 6-8 hours. Tanker scheduling at some locations was 12
hours flying, 12 hours off, 12 hours alert. Thirty-hour crew duty days existed. Crew rest periods of less than 6 hours were not
uncommon. Sleep periods in many locations were interrupted by jet noise and SCUD missile alerts. Dedicated "day" and "night"
squadrons worked well. Heavy air tasking orders, especially at the start of the war forced significant deviations from normal crew
rest/scheduling practices. Fatigue was a consideration in at least two non-combat fatal mishaps during Desert Storm. Real time
acquisition of intelligence made targeting and retargeting information available more rapidly than in past wars. Some night
surgeons felt line commanders had a poor understanding of the effects of stress and chronic fatigue. Many felt the aircrews were
pushed to the limits, and that had the war lasted any longer, substantial adverse impact on performance and flying safety would
have occurred.

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