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File: aaabf_30.txtDesert Shield/Desert Storm Aerospace Medicine Consolidated After Action Report Findings: D e p 1 o y m e n t -The SME concept was validated. -In many cases, airlift priority decisions precluded ATC package from arriving concurrently with the SME or forced last minute downsizing of pallets - at 10 of 14 locations, the ATC equipment package arrived more than 4 days after the SME or a complete package never arrived at all -In many cases, squadrons departed home base without knowing their beddown location or the initial location was changed in route -Many false starts occurred in the deployment phase resulting in additional emotional turmoil and crew rest problems - 65% of fighter pilots used "Go" pills on the deployment flight -Only a few night surgeons were part of the deployment planning Crisis Action Teams or "Paring and Tailoring" Committees such as that used successfully by AFSOC -Medical intelligence was adequate and accessible when the destination was known -SAC and Aeromedical Evacuation night surgeons were deployed as individuals and were disadvantaged in having to learn the missions and to establish rapport and integrate with new units from scratch -There was a tendency among fighter pilots to carry too little water for the long deployment leg -There were problems with inflight urinary collection systems such as disconnections or insufficient storage capacity -Deploying flight surgeons packed medical supplies on life support and other "pallets of opportunity" or in cockpits as well as hand carried a portion of the 250 lbs. of optional ATC gear. In many cases these were the only medical supplies for the first several days -30.
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