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File: aaabf_31.txt
Page: 31
Total Pages: 51

E m p l o y m e n t

-16 food-borne outbreaks occurred in theater at 10 different locations, due in most part to the inability to inspect 
and enforce recommendations to contract food service operations.

-Commanders were reluctant to follow medical recommendations to close contract food services because of 
adverse impact on morale.

-Face-to-face sensitive and polite communication with the- local medical authorities usually resulted in good 
host nation support.

-"Go" medications were used by 57% of TAC pilots during Desert Storm, and considered essential to operations 
by 61% of those who used them.

-Fatigue was the most significant and pervasive aircrew problem in Operation Desert Storm.

-Heavy air tasking orders, especially early in the war forced significant deviations from normal crew 
rest/scheduling practices

-Dedicated "day" and "night" squadrons worked well. ;

-It appears that real-time acquisition of intelligence made targeting and retargeting information available more 
rapidly than in past wars.

-The pace of the war was so rapid that many individuals did not have time to deal with personal emotions such 
as loss of a squadron mate or the reality of killing

-Vehicles of opportunity served as "ambulances" for flight line response, but lack of equipment packages often 
relegated them to a transport-only role

-Missed meals were a problem for aircrews either because dining halls were not open during ground times or 
pilots chose sleeping over eating in a demanding schedule

-Although contact lenses deteriorated more rapidly in theater, the program worked well for those who chose to 
continue use

C o m m a n d  a n d  C o n t r o 1

-Lack of understanding of the aeromedical mission by the ATH personnel created counterproductive tensions 
within the overall medical support structure

-Reporting requirements were conflicting and overlapping

-Command and control of SME's was frequently misunderstood by the medical command structure resulting in 
impaired effectiveness of overall medical care and aeromedical support to the flying squadrons

-31-


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