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(1) Activation of ARC Forces.

Observation. Air National Guard AE elements were allowed to volunteer 
for 30-day periods for the first five months of the operation, while 
at the same time, Air Force Reserve AE elements were both voluntarily 
and involuntarily activated by UTC.

Discussion. ANG personnel were given the option of volunteering for 
thirty-day periods, with an option to extend in fifteen-day 
increments, for the first five months of Operation DESERT SHIELD. 
This policy caused severe problems in establishing and maintaining 
continuity of AE operations throughout the AOR, with specific 
problems in mission coverage, billeting and tracking of individuals 
as the theater expanded to over ten AECH beddown locations. After 
travel time into and out of the AOR, jet lag adjustment, and 
orientation, only minimum time was available for mission tasking. As 
a result, many of the personnel at C-130 beddown locations had to be 
replaced every two weeks. The NGB rotation policy, although essential 
to filling the immediate need for AE personnel in August and 
September, became very cumbersome and time consuming to manage as the 
number of AECMs increased to support the AE system. Additionally, 
activating AFRes forces by UTC at the same time the ANG forces were 
allowed to volunteer caused additional problems. Unit commanders had 
difficulty in filling UTCs with available personnel since entire 
units weren't activated. Moreover, the dichotomy of policies resulted 
in major morale problems among the AE forces

Recommendation. Although volunteers are essential to meet the 
immediate personnel demands during the initial phase of any AE 
contingency operation, activation of ARC personnel should be for a 
minimum of 90 days to ensure adequate mission support and continuity 
of operations. Most importantly, the NGB and AFRes need to have 
coordinated and standardized activation policies for contingency 
operations.

(2) AE Chain of Command.

Observation. Early in the Operation, confusion existed within some 
CENTAF directorates as to the chain of command for AE forces.

Discussion. Many personnel are apparently not aware that AE forces 
work for the Commander, Airlift Forces, not the Theater Surgeon. 
Although this misunderstanding never caused significant problems, at 
least in the AOR, it did result in some confusion as to ownership of 
personnel and assets.

Recommendation. The publishing of MACR 164-1 should clarify the AE 
chain of command, at least within MAC. However, Air Force and DOD 
regulations must be perfectly clear on this point to ensure 
understanding on the part of the other major commands, as well as our 
sister services.

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